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This paper surveys the literature en the relationship
between hospital costs and decision-making processes. Costs
are seen as consequences of decisions made by four groups
within the hospital setting: (1) board of trustees; (2)
administrator; (3) medical director; and (4) medical staff.
These sets of organizational players are studied in terms of
functions and responsibilities, compatibility in a profes-
sional bureaucracy, powers and influences, and goals.
Attempts are made to discern what kinds of decisions are made
by each group and what impact those decisions will have on
costs.
The authors conclude that cost control mechanisms can
focus on either resource availability or resource utilization
The former is seen as multi- influenced while the latter is
essentially controlled by physicians. An argument is made
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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last 20 years the health care delivery system
in the United States has been characterized by spiraling
costs. Health care is consuming an ever larger portion of
the nation's Gross National Product. The increase in health
expenditures can be attributed to many factors, including
changes in demographics of the population, technological
innovation, growth of health insurance, and increased reli-
ance on government programs such as Medicare and Medicaid.
As the delivery of medical care has become more costly and
complex, increasing interest has been focused on the organ-
ization of the health care delivery system. Much of this
attention has centered on the hospital.
Hospital costs have shown the steepest rise of any seg-
ment of health care. Consequently, hospitals have received
increasing scrutiny from external agencies, both private and
public. Most of the recent hospital legislation has focused
on cost and quality control. The extent to which such regu-
latory models are applicable to the hospital setting is open
to question. Managerial and clinical efficiency are often
seen as conflicting rather than accommodating issues.
Hospital legislation may be characterized in general as
moving toward centralization of external, administrative
authority. Whether such authority can filter down through
the organization of a single hospital is problematic.

The health, care literature presents opposing views of the
hospital's uniqueness. Some see each institution as a single
enterprise, exhibiting such peculiar organizational arrange-
ments as to make interhospital comparisons difficult. Others
believe that hospitals exhibit sufficient homogeneity to
generalize about the probable outcomes of regulatory inter-
ventions .
While recognizing that many of the costs in hospitals
are external and largely uncontrollable, such as inflation,
one can hypothesize that significant portions of hospital
expenditures are internally generated. The purpose of this
study is two- fold: (^1) to identify the organizational
realities of nonprofit, general-purpose hospitals, and (2)
to relate these realities to possible cost control mechanisms
within the hospital. Research centered on a comprehensive
review of the hospital literature, especially those articles
and studies describing the political and organizational
characteristics of the hospital.
Rather than concentrating on costs directly, attention
has been focused on the institution's decision-making process
Such an approach is based on the premise that internally con-
trollable costs are not an independent phenomena, but the
direct result of the decisions made by the main players in
the hospital setting. Although the hospital contains many
varying occupations and roles, the research has centered on
four primary groups: (1) governing boards; (2) administra-
tors; (3} medical directors; and C^} medical staff. It is
10

hypothesized that the nature of hospital costs, as well as
cost control mechanisms, are intertwined with the political,
organizational, and decisional realities of these groups.
Decisions in the hospital have been studied from three
perspectives. Chapter II details, from a somewhat mechanical
viewpoint, the duties, functions, and responsibilities of the
hospital decision-makers. It is largely normative, describ-
ing what each player should do, rather than what he actually
does. This chapter sets forth the formal organization of the
hospital.
Chapters III and IV examine some of the behavioral aspects
of the hospital. Chapter III focuses on the characteristics
of professionalization and bureaucratization that occur within
the institution. The hospital is seen as a conflict model in
its attempts to integrate differing viewpoints of authority
and control. Chapter IV synthesizes the types and degrees of
influence that each group may bring to bear on the hospital.
The power to influence is seen as synonymous with the power
to make decisions.
Chapter V looks at decisions in terms of individual, group,
and institutional goals. Goals, whether implicit or explicit,
are hypothesized to be the results of leverage and power,
rather than being established a^ priori .
Chapter VI reviews decision-making in the hospital and




Finally, Chapter VII analyzes the issues raised in the
literature. It integrates the collective knowledge on tasks
and functions, power and influence, and goals. Attempts are
made to discern what kinds of decisions are made by each
group and what impact those decisions will have on costs.
12

II. FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
The American Hospital Association C^HA) has stated that
the "general responsibility of all health care institutions
is to meet the health care needs o£ their communities effec-
tively and economically." [American Hospital Association
1972, p. 3].
The formal organizational structure formulated to meet
this objective is relatively uniform from hospital to hospital.
It consists of a governing board, administrator, medical staff,
and more recently, a medical director. On the macro-level,
the functioning of these individuals and groups combine to
frame some general characteristics of the modern hospital.
Georgopoulos and Mann [1962] have summarized these as follows:
1. High degree of specialization and division of labor.
2. High degree of interdependence among various positions
in the hospital.
3. Human rather than machine system.
4. Highly formal, quasi-bureaucratic organization
structure
.
5. Authoritarian because of the need for maximum
predictability and efficiency of performance.




8. Dual lines of authority.
As expected, these characteristics create organizational
difficulties somewhat unique to the hospital setting. In the
13

late 1940' s, Ray E. Brown, a former president of the American
Hospital Association, had this to say about the uniqueness of
the hospital structure:
No other form of organization can equal the obstacles
to tranquility that are present in the medical staff-
administrator- trustee triangle. The picture of third
party independent contractors responsible for specify-
ing the services rendered to the clientele of the
enterprise, at once dependent upon the enterprise for
carrying out their orders, but independent of the
enterprise in their relationships with the enterprise's
clientele, is not to be found in any other type of
enterprise. While they are not stockholders in the
hospital, they have a deep abiding proprietary interest
because their livelihood to an ever increasing extent
is dependent upon the hospital. [Gordon 1964, p. 59].
The purpose of this chapter is two-fold: (1) to isolate
the formal organizational responsibilities of the governing
board, administrator, medical director, and medical staff,
and (2) to identify any trends that may be occurring within
those of each group. The research relies on both articles
by individuals working in a hospital setting and guidelines
published by medical organizations. Few of the authors
attempt to deal with all of the parties in a single article.
The most complete listing of functions was found in guidelines
published by the American Hospital Association and the Cath-
olic Hospital Association. Because of their importance and
length, they are included as Appendix A and Appendix B
respectively.
A. GOVERNING BOARD
The role of governing boards varies by hospital. The
kinds of roles suggested for governing boards can be summarized
14

as follows: (1} the board sets policy amd makes major
decisions; (21 the board gains resources for growth and
survival; (3} the board represents the community; and C^)
the board is advisory to top management. Of course, these
roles are not exclusive and may be found in varying degrees
in all hospitals.
Despite the varying roles that a board may assume, stud-
ies have indicated that the composition of boards display
many similarities. Kovner [1974] found that the typical
hospital board member was male, from 50-69 years old, and
had been on the hospital board for more than five years.
Additionally, the majority are businessmen, bankers, or law-
yers. Similar results were obtained in studies by Berger,
Goldberg, and Wentz.
Although the majority of trustees were in the three
career classifications listed above, it would be of some
interest to know all the different individuals who have
some input into the governing process. The results of such
a study conducted by Gilmore and Wheeler [1972] are detailed
in Table I. Of particular interest is the finding that
physicians participated on a majority of the boards. In the
past, the governing board of not-for-profit hospitals has
been composed primarily of individuals who are neither em-
ployed by the institution or a part of its medical staff.
However, in recent years there has been a trend toward in-
cluding administrators and doctors on the board. This is




HOSPITALS WITH AT LEAST ONE MEMBER
IN CAREER. CLASSIFICATION





Other Health Professions 141 51.6




Small Business Proprietor 224 50.0
Blue-Collar Supervisor 67 14.9




Minority Group 48 10.7
[p. 106].
The American Hospital Association (AHA) , in its guide-
lines on "Governance of Health Care Institutions," adopted
in February 1978, stated that:
[Physicians] should be selected [to the governing board]
for their ability to assist the institution in achieving
its goals. The charge to the physician should be the
same as that for any other board member. Every member,
including the physician, should recognize that his lead-
ership must be directed toward assisting the institution,




50% 67% 77% 78%
40% 56% 67% 67%
56% 73% 82% 83%
AHA surveys o£ non- governmental , not-for-profit hospitals
indicate the following trend in physician membership on boards
of trustees:
TABLE II
TRENDS IN MEDICAL STAFF MEMBERSHIP ON GOVERNING BOARDS
1971 1973 1976 1977
n=2,904 n=2,571 n=2,904 n=2,896
All Hospitals
Fewer than 100 beds
100 Beds or more
[Kessler ^ Tracy 1978, p. 50].
Again, although the survey shows a movement toward
physician involvement, it may be interesting to identify
which elements of the medical staff are involved. Addition-
ally, one would like to know the voting status of each physi-
cian member. In the 1976 study of 2,904 hospitals, it was
determined that in 29% the medical staff president served on
the board with full voting privileges, in 20% the president
of the medical staff sat on the board but did not vote, 20%
had other medical staff officers on the board as voting mem-
bers, 6% had other medical staff officers without vote, 50%
had non-officer medical staff members on the governing board




A note of caution is appropriate at this point. Although
the literature is. overwhelmingly in favor of physician member^
ship on governing boards, there is little evidence supporting
a correlation between board composition and hospital perfor-
mance. Solutions that encompass restructuring of the board,
such as consumer and physician involvement, may be intuitively
desirable but offer no promise of success in improving
institutional performance.
In the preceding paragraphs some general characteristics
of the board have been discussed, as well as the trend of
increasing physician involvement in the governance structure.
Returning once again to the duties of the governing board,
the literature offers a wide spectrum of thoughts. Each
writer, based on his own background and perceptions, views
the primary role of a trustee differently.
Since case law and some statutory provisions now require
the board of trustees to ensure the quality of care provided
in the hospital, some writers believe that the ultimate
responsibility of the board is control over medical staff
appointments and the determination of individual staff priv-
ileges. The governing board exercises this control function
through the review and approval of medical staff bylaws. It
is their duty to ensure that the bylaws reflect the overall
hospital organization and objectives. On the other hand,
Christian [1972J believes that the most critical duty of the
board is the choosing of a chief executive officer (CEO).
18

Hicks [1975] believes that since hospital hoards tend to
he self -perpetuating, the primary responsibility of "today's
trustees is to ensure a continuing board characterized by
integrity, high quality, purpose, and adaptability to change."
[p. 41]. O'Connor [1977] views the functions of the board as
choosing the CEO; developing hospital priorities; defining
the administrative team; evaluation; being informed and con-
sistent; setting the social, educational, and business climate
of the institution; and asking the right questions at the
right time. His solution to hospital management problems is
based on strengthening the structural and functional relation-
ships to improve top management communications. A somewhat
less flattering view of a governing board's role was penned
by Townsend [1970] when he described its function as a "tree
full of owls- -hooting when management heads into the wrong
part of the forest." [p. 101].
Koontz [1976] has identified the duties of the board from
a different approach. He has described the functions of the
board in terms of the decision-making powers it should reserve
for itself. These responsibilities include decisions (1) pre-
scribed by law or charter, (2) determining total enterprise
objectives or goals, (3) involving approval of major strate-
gies and policies, (4) involving appointment of officers and
major managers, (5) involving approval of top management com-
pensation, (J)) involving approval of budgets, (7) involving
approval of major plans and program commitments, and (8)
involving approval of independent auditors and general counsel.
19

Even though the literature offers diverse comments on
the board's responsibilities, many of the functions recur.
In general, the normative writings identify the following
as functions of the governing board:
1. To establish corporate goals and major policies.
2. To ensure that plans and programs are implemented
to meet corporate needs.
3. To establish and maintain procedures for conducting
the business of the governing boards.
4. To provide for the hospital's long-range financial
stability.
5. To select and maintain a qualified medical staff
and to ensure that the staff is properly organized.
6. To evaluate all phases of hospital performance,
including the quality of medical care, and ensure
that established standards are met.
7. To select the chief executive officer, define his
duties and responsibilities, and evaluate his
performance.
8. To review and approve the hospital's overall organ-
izational structure.
9. To ensure that the community the hospital serves
is well informed about the hospital's goals and
performance. [Prybil 1976].
Although the literature is replete with normative state-
ments regarding the functions of trustees, little effort has
been made to empirically test these assertions. One exception
to this oversight is a study conducted by Hickey [1972]. The
initial phase of his research consisted of a literature review
to determine whether general agreement on the functions of hos
pital boards of directors exists. He concluded that ten
management responsibilities were significant and recurring:
20

(1) establish institutional objectives, (J.) organize the
board of directors to perform the work of the board, iZ)
review and approve major plans and programs, C^] review and
approve major institutional policies, (5) select, appoint
and evaluate the chief executive officer, (^6) maintain qual-
ified staff, (7) perform advisory role to operating manage-
ment, (8) review and approve major institutional decisions,
(9) evaluate institutional performance, and (10) trusteeship.
If Hickey had concluded his work at this point, his contribu-
tion would have been of some interest but hardly valuable as
an insight into the actual workings of the board. His work,
like that before him, would have remained largely normative
rather than descriptive. However, Hickey sought to test his
literature-based model by surveying practicing hospital
trustees as to their agreement with his list as well as a
ranking as to the importance of each. Out of 527 respondents,
between 90 - 99% agreement was indicated except for function
(6), "Maintain qualified medical staff," which received
approximately 80% agreement. Twelve percent of the respond-
ents offered additional functions with primary emphasis on
(1) public relations, [2) finance and fund raising, and (3)
long-range planning.
From the standpoint of understanding the trustees' per-
ceptions of their responsibilities, the data on the relative




DIRECTORS' RANKING OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FUNCTIONS
OF HOSPITAL TRUSTEES BY PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS
Function High Medium Low
i)lect, Appoint § Evaluate CEO 93. 21 5.52 1.27
stablish Institutional Objectives 90. 96 7.11 1.93
jview/Approve Major Plans 5
,:ograms
90 32 8.47 1.21
Wiew/Approve Major Hospital
plicies 87 24 11.52
1.24
•usteeship 84 36 12.85 2.79
iintain Qualified Medical Staff 82 07 15.49 2.44
raluate Institutional Performance 78 08 19.40 2.52
'ganize Board of Directors 77 70 17.88 4.42
.view/Approve Major Institu-
^^^^^ 2^^53 2.38[Lonal Decisions
Mineral Advisory Role to
magement 63.78 29.44 6.78
,49].
One startling result of the survey is the significant
i
Der of trustees (24^) who view their responsibilities on
;)r institutional decisions as less than high. Addition-
^, although the selection of the CEO rates as the primary
t'', a subsequent advisory role to the CEO ranks at the very
i:om of the list. This would seem to indicate that trustees
|>their most important duty as appointing the administrator





The hospital literature on functions of the administrator
includes writings of both a normative and descriptive nature.
A few of the authors suggest a uniqueness or singularity to
hospital administration. Most have included administrators
in the larger, managerial role.
The governing board— administrator relationship is fre-
quently described in the following manner: the administrator
recommends, the board approves, and the administrator subse-
quently implements the approved policies [Ainsworth 1976]
.
"However, the administrator is also a representative of the
consumer, and, as chief executive of the organization, of the
non-physician employees whose willingness to participate must
be obtained for the organization to be effective." [Kovner
1978, p. 364].
A chief executive officer of the hospital is known vari-
ously as the superintendent, the hospital administrator, the
executive director, the executive vice-president, and the
president [Johnson, E.A. 1966]. Richard L. Johnson [1970]
views the role of the executive head of the hospital as one
evolving from superintendent to president. He says that such
a shift has not occurred for prestige reasons but rather
because of the changing role of the chief executive.
However, a survey conducted by Wren and Hilgers [1974]
indicates varied reasons for title changes. A questionnaire
was sent to 265 hospitals who had changed from an administra-
tive title to an executive title. One hundred eighty replied
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for a 68% rate o£ return. Two hundred fifty-eight responses
were received because some respondents gave more than one
answer. These were classified as follows: 71 respondents
felt the new title more adequately described the position;
73 indicated that it resulted from a change in the organiza-
tion; 33 said it was directly related to increased responsi-
bility of the hospital administrator; 19 said that it was
suggested by the board of directors; 17 agreed that "it's a
trend," 15 thought the public related to it more easily; 11
indicated that a new man assumed the job who wanted an exec-
utive title; 10 said the change was made when the hospital
administrator became a member of the board; 4 felt this
change in title would be politically expedient; and 3 said
it was suggested by a consultant.
Austin [1974] points out that administration consists
of two primary subsets, internal functions and external
responsibilities. The former relates to the administrator's
functions within the institution and includes such tasks as
organization, budgeting, control, and evaluation. The latter
focuses on the institution's interactions with the environ-
ment and includes such tasks as program planning, policy
decisions, and coordinating with other health care entities.
Gottlieb [1975J has suggested that institutions characterized
by an internal/external dichotomy are likely to have both a
chief executive officer (s>t president) and an administrator.
The former is externally oriented while the latter deals with
the institution's day-to-day operations.
24

As noted previously, there is growing support for admin-
istrator membership on governing boards. Brown [1970] has
pointed out that the internal workings of the hospital have
become so complex that the board of trustees is losing its
policy-making ability relative to the administrator. He
suggests that because the administrator's day-to-day actions
are, in effect, implicit policy, the administrator should
become a voting member of the board. In this way, the admin-
istrator and the board become unified in providing direction
to the institution.
"The administrator is, essentially, an extension of the
board, fulfilling the hospital needs for direction by acting
as the board would act in directing the day-to-day activities
of the institution." [Opp 1962, p. 19]. Stated another way,
the administrator functions as the agent of the board, with
the board being the principal. This relationship is supported
by Cartmill [1970] , who points out that because an administra-
tor is an agent of the board, he is also a part of the board.
From his perspective, the hospital consists of two important
entities: (1) the governing board/administrator on the one
hand, and (2) the medical staff on the other.
A majority of the literature views the role of an admin-
istrator from the standpoint of traditional organizational
theory. The Commission on the Education for Health Adminis-
tration has defined health administration as "planning, organ-
izing, directing, controlling, and coordinating the resources
and procedures by which needs and demand for health and
25

medical care and a healthful environment are fulfilled by-
provision of specific services to individual clients, or-
ganizations, and communities." [Austin 1974, p. 14]. Schulz
and Johnson [1976] have described the functions of adminis-
tration as: (_1] establishing or helping to establish insti-
tutional goals and objectives; C2) planning strategies,
policies, and tactics to achieve goals; (3) establishing a
managerial climate for carrying them out; (4) establishing
and controlling systems and subsystems; and (5) integrating
systems
.
Johnson [1970] describes the primary responsibility of
the administrator as one of coordinating diverse interest
groups, of developing long-range plans, of determining
capital needs and sources, and of controlling the operations
of the hospital. Kovner [1978] believes the most important
function of an administrator is to act as a "change agent."
This view is based on the need for orderly change to deal
with such institutional problems as increased specialization,
changing technology, and new health care expectations. Thus,
the administrator is seen as a facilitator and integrator.
Studies focusing on what an administrator actually does
are also usually structured from the traditional managerial
perspective. For example, in a work sampling study, Connors
and Hutt [1967] found that administrators spent time on the
following activities, in order:
1. E:xtramural Tasks: activities which have no direct
relationship to the internal operations of the hospital, yet
26

are vital parts of the administrative function; they include:
continuing education, teaching and lecturing, and activities
with outside agencies.
2. Planning: defining and clarifying problems, deter-
mining facts and alternative solutions, choosing a solution,
and arranging for execution.
3. Controlling: checking and reporting of performance.
4. Organizing: dividing and grouping work to be done,
assembling resources.
5. Directing and Coordinating: giving instructions;
indicating what, how, and why a job should be done.
6. Personal Tasks: lunch, coffee breaks, and other
activities not related to the job.
In general, the functions and responsibilities of hospital
administrators appear to be ill-defined in the literature.
Although it is generally agreed that they act as agents to
the board of trustees, specific identification of duties seems
to be limited to the traditional management function euphe-
misms of planning, organizing, directing, staffing, and control
C. MEDICAL DIRECTOR
The position of a full-time medical director is a rela-
tively new occurrence in hospital organization. It has largely
come about from court decisions and legislative actions that
have held the board of trustees both morally and legally
responsible for the quality of professional services provided
by the institution. The landmark case in this area is Darling
27

vs. Charleston Coimnunity Memorial Hospital , where the court
said that it is the hospital governing board's duty to estab-
lish mechanisms for the medical staff to evaluate, counsel,
and when necessary, to take action when an unreasonable risk
of harm to a patient arises from his treatment. Prior to
this judgement, the legal responsibility of trustees had
focused primarily on the board's duty to select competent
administrators
.
Other forces causing an increase in the number of full-
time salaried medical directors are the increasing complex-
ities of the hospital organization and increasing demands for
public accountability [Williams 1978], Thus, the medical
director came into being as a member of the administration,
responsible for the medical staff and their activities in the
hospital
.
Although there is general agreement among trustees,
administrators, and physicians that the medical director is
a "company man" whose primary allegiance belongs to the hos-
pital rather than the medical staff, his position in the top
management structure remains somewhat muddled. Should he
report through the administrator or directly to the board of
trustees? What is his relation to the medical staff and what
input should the medical staff have in his selection? And
finally, what mix of professional and administrative respon-
sibilities should he have vis-a-vis the hospital administrator?
The level of the medical director's responsibilities may
be viewed from two general perspectives: (1) the director
28

should function as a coordinator with no authority connected
with his duties; or C2}.the director functions in a hier-
archical position with authority over the medical staff.
Wilson [1971J suggests that in the former the medical direc-
tor is primarily a physician, while in the latter, adminis-
tration predominates. However, Fischer [1975B] believes that
the medical director actually functions from a combination of
both: "The essence of the physician-director's authority is
his ability to lead those responsible for making the decision
to the correct choice." [pp. 46-47]. This seems to suggest
that the medical director must have both power and influence
within the organization to be effective. Additionally, it
implies that the director must possess both professional
competence and administrative expertise. As Fischer has
commented, the position of medical director has created a
new medical subspecialty- -hospital management.
Since few authors agree with regard to the exact role of
the director, the duties ascribed to him are varied. One
author has proposed that physicians and hospitals both pursue
the same ultimate goal, the provision of quality patient care.
Therefore, "conflicts arise only in connection with how that
care is to be provided- -not by whom, but in what manner. The
task of the medical administrator, then, is to avoid conflicts
because only means, and not ends, are involved." [Kemp 1973,
p. 19] . Kemp's perspective assumes a separation of processes
and outcomes that may not exist. Since "quality health care"
is largely unmeasurable , it is inherent that conflicts will
center on alternative means of providing care.
29

Others view the primary responsibility of the director
as promoting an effective organization of the medical staff
because, through this effort, the medical director has the
most impact on the improvement of institutional care
[F. Wilson 1971] . Peters [1974] believes the functions of
a medical director should include medical staff organization,
clinical department supervision, patient care evaluation,
medical education and research, long-range planning, creden-
tialing, and liaison between the medical staff, administrator,
and governing board. Another writer views the director's
duties as recruiting, internal management, external manage-
ment, complaints, and the development of new ideas [Pollard
1976]
.
Williams [1965] suggests that the medical director operate
as a "multicrat." This involves functioning: "(1) as a
democrat, prepared to compromise if he is going to get his
key people to give leadership and accept responsibility for
the professional practices of their confreres; (2) as a
bureaucrat when it is necessary to think of the institution
and the development of total systems; and (3) as an autocrat
when firm, hard decisions have to be made when he alone is
going to have to answer for success or failure." [p. 74].
In summary, the position of the medical director is
evolving along two fronts: (J.) the identification of his
responsibilities and authority in regard to the medical staff,
and (J.} his position and functions relative to the hospital's
administration. The former is becoming increasingly well
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defined in the literature. Williams [1978] has constructed
a comprehensive list concerning the scope o£ the medical
director's medical staff responsibilities:
1. To assure that appropriate systems- -essential for
the ongoing review, analysis, and evaluation of
physician's performance- -are established and main-
tained on a continuing basis.
2. To keep informed of the activities and findings of
all medical staff surveillance programs and to
promptly direct the necessary corrective measures.
3. To keep the administrator and the board informed of
such findings and to report the necessary recommen-
dations for action whenever the findings so require.
4. To monitor and assure medical staff compliance with
corporate bylaws, medical staff bylaws, rules and
regulations, hospital policies, and local, state, and
federal regulations.
5. To keep the CEO, the president of the staff, and the
executive committee of the medical staff informed of .
all infractions and violations of hospital policy,
and to submit a plan for corrective action as indi-
cated.
6. To assure that the necessary criteria and professional
standards regarding applications for appointments to
the staff- are established and strictly adhered to.
7. To assure that a procedure for supervision of all new
appointees for a stated period of time is established
and kept viable and that routine reports are made at
stated intervals to the executive committee and to
appropriate committees of the board.
8. To make certain that all members of the medical staff
are afforded due process whenever, for any reason,
their clinical performance is open to question,
whenever disciplinary procedures are contemplated,
or whenever their clinical privileges may be reduced,
rescinded, revoked, or temporarily suspended.
9. To establish and maintain formal programs of contin-
uing medical education.
10. To direct and guide chairmen of clinical departments
and committees in setting and attaining objectives




Virtually all of these functions were previously the
responsibility of the medical staff president, at least in
kind if not in degree. The transfer of these duties to the
director may be viewed as an attempt to increase the hospi-
tal's formal control over the medical staff.
Conversely, the relationship between the medical director
and the administrator remains vague. This is not surprising
as the authority and responsibility of the medical director
(relative to the administrator) are not uniform from hospital
to hospital, but rather seem to be individually negotiated
among the parties involved.
D. MEDICAL STAFF
The final component having responsibility for the manage-
ment and operations of the hospital is the medical staff. It
is a self-governing organization comprised of all the physi-
cians who have been granted privileges to practice in the
hospital.
The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH)
states: "There shall be a single organized medical staff that
has the overall responsibility for the quality of all medical
care provided to patients, and for the ethical conduct and
professional practices of its members as well as accounting
therefore to the governing board." Kennedy [1974] details
four reasons for the existence of an organized medical staff.
1. To provide in an organized and logical manner for
the care of all patients referred to the hospital.
2. To provide a means by which problems of a medical-




3. To govern and administer its own members.
4. To provide a facility for teaching interns,
residents, and others if the hospital has an
educational program.
The functions of the organized medical staff may be sum-
marized as: CI) providing professional care to the sick and
injured in the hospital; C2) maintaining its own efficiency;
(3) self-government; (4) participating in education; (5)
auditing the professional work; and (6) furnishing advice
and assistance to the administrator and governing board
[MacEachern 1957]
.
A number of writers, in an attempt to clarify the organi-
zational responsibilities of the medical staff, have observed
that medical staff self-government should not be taken to
mean that the medical staff is autonomous. Rather, the med-
ical staff derives its authority to organize and elect officers
within the parameters set down by the governing board. Spe-
cifically, the physicians determine medical staff policy,
membership eligibility, professional standards, and perfor-
mance evaluation mechanisms, subject to the approval of the
board [Harrison 1972; Johnson 1970; 5 Peters 1974].
The governing board delegates to the medical staff the
responsibility for the quality of patient care. Simultan-
eously, the board must set a mechanism by which the medical
staff will be accountable for their actions [Fischer 1975B]
.
Johnson [1976J suggests that each medical staff exhibits
two organizational structures: a political element and an
administrative element. The first is characterized by the
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election of officers and focuses on upward communication from
the medical staff to the governing board. The second is a
hierarchical relationship whereby authority is delegated to_
the medical staff by the governing board. Johnson contends
that while both are important, only the latter allows a suit-
able accountability structure to be developed. He envisions
three factors that will facilitate such accountability:
1. Delegations of responsibility from the governing
board to the medical staff must be clear-cut and
identifiable.
2. Authority must be granted to physicians in positions
of formal leadership in the medical staff so they
have control over the responsibilities they have
accepted.
3. The governing board must require accountability
from those members of the medical staff who have
accepted positions of formal leadership.
Whereas the medical director is appointed by the governing
board, the medical staff retains the right to elect its own
officers. The head of the medical staff usually carries the
title of president. Since his power base is derived from the
medical staff constituency, his actions should be designed to
represent the views and interests of the medical staff.
Williams [1978] has described the functions of the president
of the medical staff as those analogous to a shop steward.
The president lacks the formal organizational authority but
has considerable influence over the hospital's operation.
In addition to the president, the medical staff elects
other officers, such, as vice-president, secretary, and treas-
urer. These individuals, in combination with other staff-
elected and board-appointed representatives, form the medical
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staff executive committee. This body represents the primary
medical staff input into the operations of the institution.
The medical director, and occasionally the administrator, are
included in an advisory role. According to JCAH standards,
the functions of the executive committee should include the
following
:
1. Receive and act upon reports of staff committees.
2. Consider and recommend action on all matters of a
medico-administrative nature.
3. Implement approved policies of the medical staff.
4. Make recommendations to the governing body.
5. Take all reasonable steps to ensure professionally
ethical conduct on the part of the staff members and
to initiate such prescribed corrective measures as
are indicated.
6. Fulfill accountability to the governing body for the
medical care rendered to patients in the hospital.
7. Ensure that the medical staff is kept abreast of the
accreditation program.
The remaining medical staff committees are primarily
concerned with some aspect of utilization review or profes-
sional standards and include such entities as medical audit
committee, tissue committee, medical records committee, and
pharmacy and therapeutics committee.
Other mechanisms exist, outside the formal medical staff
organization, for physicians' input into the institution's
management. As mentioned previously, physicians are becoming
more acceptable as members of the governing board. However,
some difficulties may arise in the perception of the duties
of a physician trustee. The medical staff may see him as
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their representative first and the hospital's agent second.
On the other hand, should the physician trustee support
decisions that are perceived as unfavorable to the medical
staff, he may be regarded as a "company man." It is clear
that the physician trustee, despite his increasing membership
on governing boards, walks a thin line between professional
responsibilities and trusteeship.
Not all writers are in favor of increased physician
participation on hospital boards. Bugbee [1970] contends
that the medical profession needs a "power base" that the
public will perceive as objective. Although he doesn't
specify the form of such a power base, he does feel that
physician involvement in governance might be considered by
the community as the beginning of physician dominance. Over
forty years ago, MacEachern listed the following difficulties
with physician representation on governing boards:
1. The physician would have competitive advantage over
his fellow staff members in private practice.
2. The physician board member would tend to represent
himself and not the staff as a whole.
3. There would be conflict of interest involved when
the physician functions on the one hand as a trustee
serving the best interests of the community and the
hospital, and on the other as a member of the medical
staff, serving his own ends to advance the status and
success of his practice or to accommodate the partisan
desires of his medical colleagues. [Eisele 1971].
MacEachern's objections tend to exemplify the difficulties
of physician representation. In fact, MacEachern himself
fails to clarify his perception of the physician trustee's
loyalty and duty. Should he, in fact, represent the medical
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staff as implied by objection two? Or should he serve the
interests of the community and hospital as implied by objec-
tion three?
Other methods for obtaining physician involvement are
medical staff officer attendance at board meetings in an
advisory capacity and appointment of staff physicians as
members of governing board committees.
Although the medical staff has, by virtue of its organ-
ization and bylaws, a formal position within the hospital,
the reader is cautioned against the assumption that physicians
are a homogeneous lot. In fact, many issues fractionalize
the medical staff. Some of the more obvious include:
1. Competition: political in-fighting between factions
of the medical staff.
2. Role of the general practitioner vs. specialists in
the hospital.
3. Town vs. gown: rivalry between teaching and practicing
physicians and the role and power of the medical school
in the hospital.
4. Struggle for beds: high occupancy hospitals and the
competition among physicians for beds.
5. Jurisdictional disputes: decisions concerning clin-
ical privileges. [Gottlieb 1975].
In general, physicians with administrative responsibilities
within the hospital fall into two categories: (1) those
elected by the medical staff; and (2) those appointed by the
board. The former become the leaders of the medical staff
and represent the staff's views to the administration. The
latter bear primary allegiance to the institution. Clearly,
there is room for varying perceptions and goals among these
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two groups. When the diversity of specialities within the
medical staff is added to this dichotomy, it is somewhat dif-
ficult to view the hospital physicians as a single group.
Differing constituencies, as well as differing objectives,
militates against a unified, physician-oriented institutional
goal.
E . SUMMARY
The preceding pages have discussed both the functions of
the main players within the hospital setting as well as some
of the trends within each group. A summary of the trends
predominant in the literature can be listed as follows:
1. Trustees are held to be legally, as well as morally,
responsible for the quality of care in the hospital.
2. Physicians are winning increasing acceptance as
members of the .governing board.
3. Administrators are evolving from the traditional
"superintendent" position of managing hotel services to one
of "chief executive officer," responsible to the board for
the hospital's operation.
4. Medical directors are finding increasing acceptance
as the administrator of the medical staff, representing the
institution in hospital-medical staff relationships.
5. The organization of the medical staff has remained
largely unchanged with the exception that the functions of
the president of the staff must be redefined in relation to
the tasks of the medical director.
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These trends seem to indicate that the hospital has
recognized that: "Administrative activities increasingly
touch upon the practice of medicine, and clinical practice,
in turn, is heavily involved with issues of managerial effi-
ciency and effectiveness." [Shortell 1974, p. 97].
At first glance, one might assume that each party is
being co-opted to a degree into another party's traditional
position. Alternatively, one might view these trends as
power struggles designed to influence the organization's
structure and internal workings. One striking feature of
the literature review on functions and responsibilities is
the lack of information relating goals to the tasks described
Other than a few vague comments asserting that all hospital
members have "quality care" as their guiding principle, goals
at both the individual and instutional level are ignored.
One hypothesis of this paper is that goals should precede
the identification of duties. To this end, the following
chapters review the micro- institutional literature from a
behavioral and structural perspective. One would like to
identify what goals the various interests in the hospital




III. PROFESSIONALIZATION AND BUREAUCRATIZATION
Organizations are social units consisting of a network
of relations which orients and regulates the behavior among
a specific set of individuals in the pursuit of relatively
specific goals. An organization is said to be formal to the
extent that positions are identified and defined and rela-
tions with other positions specified independently of the
characteristics of the individuals occupying the positions
[Scott 1964]. Simon points out that organizations are "com-
plex patterns of communication and other relations in a group
of human beings. The pattern provides to each member of the
group much of the information, assumptions, goals and atti-
tudes that enter into his decisions, and provides him also
with a set of stable and comprehensible expectations as to
what the other members of the group are doing and how they
will react to what he says and does." [Simon 1957, p. 10].
Each participant in the hospital tends to view the organ-
ization and other participants from different perspectives.
Each participant has, by virtue of his or her location in
the structure, a set of interests that influence attitudes
toward organized activities. If the activity has no per-
ceived effect on those activities, the stance is often
indifference; if it is perceived as enhancing the interests,
then the stance is positive and if it is perceived as being
against the interest, the stance will be negative.
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Much of the anecdotal literature dealing with the
hospital setting has focused on "dual lines of authority";
the physician on one hand and the governing board/ adminis-
trator on the other. When sociologists review this feature
of the hospital, they tend to view this dichotomy as one
between professionalization and bureaucratization. As
Mechanic [1976] has pointed out, "Throughout the world there
has been growing bureaucratization of medical practice, and
as physicians more commonly work in organized settings they
are increasingly subjected to conflicting demands and
incentives." [p. 41].
The purpose of this chapter is not to review exhaustively
the literature on hospital organizational theory, but rather
to focus on the characteristics of professionalism and bur-
eaucracy. Such an approach seems a plausible method of iden-
tifying those areas which are in conflict. It is hypothesized
that the major differences between the two concepts will center
on authority and control. Additionally, one may posit that
issues of authority and control naturally lead to secondary
issues concerning the power, influence, and values of each
entity. Since these secondary issues will be dealt with later,
this chapter is designed primarily to provide the reader with
a background knowledge to facilitate the understanding of
Chapter IV.
A. CHARACTERISTICS OF BUREAUCRACY
The main characteristics of a bureaucratic structure,
according to Weber, are the following:
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1. The regular activities required for the purpose of
the organization are distributed in a fixed way as official
duties
.
2. The organization of offices follows the principle of
hierarchy; that is, each lower office is under the control
and supervision of a higher one.
3. Operations are governed by a consistent system of
abstract rules and consist of the application of these rules
to particular cases.
4. The ideal official conducts his office in a spirit
of formalistic impersonality, without hatred or passion, and
hence without affection or enthusiasm.
5. Employment in the bureaucratic organization is based
on technical qualifications and is protected against arbitrary
dismissal. There is a system of promotions according to
seniority or to achievement, or both.
6. Experience tends universally to show that the purely
bureaucratic type of administrative organization is, from a
purely technical point of view, capable of attaining the
highest degree of efficiency. [Blau ^ Meyer 1978].
Additional features have been identified as character-
istics of a bureaucratic mode of organization. These include:
7. Authority and obligations are specified a priori.
8. There is a separation of policy and administrative
positions
.




10. Division of labor and specialization are emphasized.
[Blau § Scott 1962]
.
Despite various criticisms in the literature of Weber's
theory, it remains one of the most often used explanations
of complex organizations. However, it should be noted that
"Weber's model of a bureaucracy was based more on the way
work was organized (the administration) than the actual per-
formance of tasks." [Jones § Jones 1975, p. 183]. This dif-
ference in focus may have substantial impact in the hospital
organization, where many of the tasks are physician initiated
and controlled.
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF PROFESSIONALIZATION
"The sociology of professions has largely focused upon
the mechanics of cohesiveness . " [Bucher § Strauss 1966, p.
181] . Gross [1958] has characterized professions as those
occupations that have: (1) an unstandardized product; (2)
personality involvement in the occupation on the part of
those who practice it; (3) a base of specialized knowledge
and techniques; (4) a sense of obligation to the occupation;
(5) group identity; and (6) a product or service which is
significant to the society. Heydebrand [1973B] sees profes-
sionalization as a continuum ranging from in-service training
to apprenticeship to formal training and the development of
an occupational subculture.
Goode [1960J has stated that the "two core characteris-
tics of a profession are a prolonged specialized training in
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a body of abstract knowledge and a service orientation."
[p. 903J . These core- characteristics give rise to a number
o£ secondary professional features:
1. The profession determines its own standards of educa-
tion and training.
2. The student professional goes through a more far-
reaching adult socialization experience than the
learner in other occupations.
3. Professional practice is often legally recognized
by some form of licensure.
4. Licensing and admission boards are manned by members
of the profession.
5. Most legislation concerned with the profession is
shaped by that profession.
6. The occupation gains in income, power, and prestige
ranking, and can demand higher caliber students.
7. The practitioner is relatively free of lay evaluation
and control.
8. The norms of practice enforced by the profession are
more stringent than legal controls.
9. iMembers are more strongly identified and affiliated
with the profession than are members of other occu-
pations with theirs.
10. The profession is more likely to be a terminal occu-
pation. Members do not care to leave it, and a higher
proportion assert that if they had to do it over again
they would again choose that type of work.
Some writers see professional autonomy as the essential
dimension of professionalism [Engel 1969J . Freidson [1970B]
suggests the main aim or characteristic of any profession is
autonomy and the protection of its independence, and that
three claims back up the physician's privilege of freedom
from control by outsiders:
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1. That there is such an unusual degree o£ skill and
knowledge involved in professional work that nonprofessionals
are not equipped to evaluate or regulate it.
2. That professionals are responsible and may be trusted
to work conscientiously without supervision.
3. That the profession itself may be trusted to under-
take the proper regulatory action on those rare occasions
when an individual does not perform his work competently or
ethically.
One widely held norm says that professional work should
not, and can not, be externally regulated. This prerogative
typically granted to professional practitioners reflects the
degree to which they have been successful in turning their
"license" into a "mandate." [Hughes 1958]. "Just as autonomy
is the test of professional status, so is self -regulation the
test of professional autonomy." [Freidson 1970B, p. 84].
Bucher and Strauss [1966] have pointed out that while
physicians are a profession on the macro level, specializa-
tion has resulted in a decrease in their homogeneity. Phy-
sicians do not necessarily share identity and values in such
areas as sense of mission, work activities, techniques, inter-
ests, and associations. Consequently, it is the segments of
the medical profession that are important to study, rather
than physicians in totality.
However, research on segments of the medical profession
may lead to frustration. This occurs because, although the
differing specialities may be readily identified, they remain
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highly interdependent. Perhaps interaction with the medical
profession can best be dealt with on a situational basis;
concentrating on segments when communication deals with them
specifically, and focusing on the medical profession as a
whole when differences are liable to generate a unified
physician front.
C. RELATIONSHIPS IN THE HOSPITAL SETTING
The terms "bureaucracy" and "professional" are often
interpreted as contrasting entities. Freidson [1970A] has
stated that:
In contrast to the negative word "bureaucracy" we have
the word "profession." This word is almost always
positive in its connotation, and is frequently used to
present a superior alternative to bureaucracy. Unlike
"bureaucracy," which is disclaimed by every organization
concerned with its public relations, "profession" is
claimed by virtually every occupation seeking to improve
its public image. When the two terms are brought to-
gether, the discussion is almost always at the expense
of bureaucracy and to the advantage of profession.
The principles underlying the two are said to be
antithetical, the consequences of one being malignant
and the other benign, [pp. 129-130].
From the previous listings of professional and bureau-
cratic characteristics, it is clear that the hospital exhibits
elements of both. Litwak [1961] has termed such an organiza-
tion a "professional bureaucracy." Participants in this type
of organization, in light of their varying goals and values,
may have differing perceptions of the hospital's activities.
Georgopoulos [1972J has categorized bureaucratic and pro-
fessional models in terms of tasks. More specifically, he
suggests that each has different orientations in regard to





Model Target Expected Outcome Criterion
Professional Client Reduction of Appropriateness,
Needs Client Problem Principles
Bureaucratic Institutional Satisfaction of Policies
Integrity Job Requirements
[p. 168].
Hudson has translated bureaucratic-professional conflict
into two organizational models. The first, serial structure,
is analogous to a bureaucratic mode of organization (see
Figure 1). It is characterized by one-dimensional communica-
tions and positional authority. The activities of individuals
organized in this manner tend to be routine, incremental, and
repetitive. Examples of such activities would include food
preparation, bill collection, and laboratory tests. Hudson
contends that the hospital governance/administration uses
this model to concentrate power and implement decisions
throughout the organization.
The second model can be described as a parallel structure
(see Figure 2). Analogous to the professional mode of organ-
ization, it is characterized by vertical, horizontal, and
cross-communication within the organization. Unlike the
serial structure, where authority is vested in the position,
the parallel structure stresses competence of the individual









on proven (s>t perceived) expertise than location in the
hierarchy. Decisions and tasks in the parallel structure
tend to be unprogrammed and non- routine in nature. The most
obvious example is physician-determined care to the individual
patient.
Hudson contends that bureaucratic-professional discord
is essentially conflict between the parallel and serial struc-
tures, the physician committed to the first and the adminis-
trator to the second. Moreover, the commitment of each is
understandable since the two types of structures differently
serve the needs of each. He concludes that the lesson to be
learned from an analysis of the two frameworks is that
organizational conflict in hospitals is primarily a result
of differing social structures rather than one of personal-
ities [Twaddle 5 Hessler 1977].
The hospital literature focuses primarily on the conse-
quences of introducing professionals into a bureaucratic
organization. It deals with the resultant conflict, accom-
modation, and coordination that takes place.
The introduction of professionals into a bureaucratic
organization will have various impacts on the institution's
structure. Hedley [1977J hypothesizes that, in relation to
more bureaucratic forms of organization, professionalism will
cause: (1) a decrease in vertical communication; (2) an
increase in horizontal communication; and (3) a greater inte-
gration between the design and execution components of work.
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Kornhauser's study identified four areas of conflict
between bureaucratic and professional organization: (1)
goals; (2) types of control; (3) incentives for professional
involvement; and (4) issues over influence and authority
[Green 1975] . Some have suggested that the appointment of a
medical director may reduce the conflict between professional
and administrative organizational roles and hierarchies, but
at the expense of the clarity of definition of the chief
executive officer. In other words, organizational conflict
is transformed into role conflict between the administrator
and the medical director [Heydebrand 1973B]
.
Professionals experience two types of organizational
conflict:
1. Conflict between professional and bureaucratic posi-
tions and hierarchies (or between bureaucratic and collegial
authority structures.)
2. Role strain and conflict within those status-roles
requiring the performance of both professional- technical and
administrative-supervisory work functions.
"Hierarchy" is a term often associated with bureaucracy,
but seldom found in a detailing of professional features.
However, while other sectors of the hospital strive for the
characteristics of professionalism, the physician remains
dominant. Only he has the authority to direct and control
the actions of others in prescribing medical care while re-
maining relatively free of formal direction and evaluation.
Thus, within the hospital there exists a hierarchy of
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institutionalized expertise. As Freidson [1970AJ has stated,
"Expertise establishes office and hierarchy analogous to
that of bureaucracy." [p. 157j
.
In her study of the control patterns among a group of
hospital physicians, Goss [1966] found that doctors in a
hierarchical position within the organization exercised
"authority" with respect to such administrative matters as
the scheduling of patients, but offered only "advice" in the
area of patient care. Additionally, Goss found that dual
authority is both established and maintained by the segrega-
tion of administrative decisions from those areas where pro-
fessional judgement is considered necessary. When a decision
is deemed administrative, enforcement by the authority of
office is accepted. Conversely, when a decision is considered
medical in nature, authority lies with the individual profes-
sional.
Goss's assertions seem to imply a clear-cut separation
between medical and administrative decisions. Moreover, it
implies a convergence of professional and bureaucratic modes
of organization. However, "convergence presupposes adequate
coordination and requires partial subordination of personal
interests to collective concerns, mutual trust and understand-
ing, and continuous voluntary cooperation, adjustment, and
readjustment by all involved." [Georgopoulos 1972].
Much of the literature focuses on cooperation and coordin-
ation as the cornerstones needed to solve conflict in the
hospital. Heydebrand suggests that: "Prof essionalization
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constitutes what could be called a nonbureaucratic mode of
coordination." [Heydebrand 1973B, p. 27]. However, he also
points out that lateral interaction and communication may
increase conflict and competition as well as cooperation.
One significant characteristic of the hospital organiza-
tion is the distinction between authority and control based
on incumbency in a position (bureaucratic) and control based
on technical competence (professional) . In the bureaucratic
mode, authority is legalistic in nature and is imparted to
the worker through a hierarchical rank structure. In the
professional mode, authority accrues to an individual in
direct proportion to his expertise in a specialized body of
knowledge. As expected, since authority evolves from differ-
ent sources, so does the manner of control. Control in the
bureaucracy rests with an organizationally-directed super-
visor, while control of professionals is accomplished by the
individual himself or through consultation and peer review
with other professional colleagues. "In short, the conflict
between professional and bureaucratic decisions is of a
jurisdictional nature and typically involves overlapping or
conflicting areas of competence." [Heydebrand 1973B, p. 85].
Engel [1970] has investigated the often published claim
that bureaucratic organization limits professional autonomy.
If such allegations are true, one should find an inverse
relationship. Engel surveyed physicians in highly bureau-
cratic, moderately bureaucratic, and nonbureaucratic settings
as to their perception of professional autonomy. The results
52

are detailed in Table V. As indicated, perceptions of
professional autonomy were highest in the moderately bureau-
cratic setting. Engel attributes this finding to the fact
that while highly bureaucratic organizations may inhibit the
physician, he must rely heavily on the social and physical
features which they provide. Thus, the physician uses the
bureaucracy to provide him with funds, equipment, technical
personnel, and other physical facilities. Since these organ-
izational attributes facilitate the physician's performance,
but do not limit his practice of medicine, the physician
views the moderately bureaucratic organization as necessary
for professional autonomy. Engel' s conclusion is that it is
not bureaucracy per se but the degree of bureaucracy that can
limit professional autonomy.
TABLE V
PHYSICIAN PERCEPTIONS OF PROFESSIONAL AUTONOMY
Professional Autonomy
Bureaucracy Low Medium High N
a.
% %
40.8 35.5 23.7 152
14.0 34.8 51.1 221




Hall [1973J has hypothesized that in some instances the
relationship between bureaucracy and professionalization
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is positive. For example, Weber's division of labor may be
very compatible with the specialization that occurs among
physicians within the hospital. Likewise, bureaucratic
promotions based on technical competence may be consistent
with the values of professionals. On the negative side. Hall
believes that hierarchical authority and extensive organiza-
tional rules and regulations are antithetical to physicians.
Hall concludes that "an equilibrium may exist between the
levels of professionalization and bureaucratization in the
sense that a particular level of professionalization may
require a certain level of bureaucratization to maintain social
control. Too little bureaucratization may lead to too many
undefined operational areas if the profession itself has not
developed operational standards for these areas." [p. 506].
Consequently, a portion of the organizational disfunctionalism
in hospitals may be the result of professional organization
rather than bureaucratic characteristics [Freidson 1970A]
.
Lentz [1957] has suggested the interesting possibility
that "the split in authority works to the benefit of the
patients since it sets up a series of checks and balances."
[p. 460]. In a general sense, Lentz may be correct. Good
medical care is dependent on a structure which will provide
enough stability that the routine aspects of care can be
efficiently carried out, coupled with enough flexibility that
^




Hedley [1977] has proposed that: "There is no necessary
conflict between professional and bureaucratic modes of work
organization, provided that appropriate areas of organiza-
tional jurisdiction are specified." [p. 61]. However, Goss's
review of recent physician/hospital studies suggests that
current external and internal cost control mechanisms have
done little to decrease physician autonomy or dominance.
Likewise, costs have not decreased appreciably.
D . SUMMARY
The modern hospital is regarded by sociologists as an
example of an institution exhibiting many of the character-
istics of a complex organization, including elements of both
professionalism and bureaucracy. Since neither organizational
theory is wholly or exclusively applicable to the hospital
setting, this chapter has attempted to describe the relation-
ships as well as to isolate both similar and conflicting
characteristics
.
Some writers see the hospital's dual line of authority
"as a structural mechanism for assuring that managerial and
economic criteria remain subordinate to clinical criteria of
efficiency in patient care." [Goss, et al. 1977, p. 4].
Others contend that "professional status is one of the poli-
tical bargaining resources which groups might use in the
pursuit of their aims." [Green 1975].
An attempt has been made to discuss both bureaucracy and
professionalism on an objective basis, without either positive
55

or negative connotations. The primary areas of conflict
seem to lie in the concepts of organizational authority and
control. On the one hand, bureaucracy stresses hierarchical
arrangements and formal rules and regulations. Conversely,
professionalism emphasizes personal autonomy and self-
regulation. When decisions within the hospital are clearly
defined and understood to be either medical or administrative
in nature, problems appear to be minimal. However, when
decisions fall within the range of authority, expertise, and
control claimed by both the physician and the institution,
difficulties are inevitable. As pointed out by Heydebrand
and Noell [1973] :
Where interests based on considerations of profit or
power are at stake, or in collision with professional
judgement based on technical expertise, the knowledge
and autonomy of professionals will tend to be sub-
ordinated to bureaucratic authority. Professionals,
in turn, will assert themselves by insisting either on
the moral superiority of their position (the welfare
of the patient) , or they will mobilize countervailing
power by controlling access to knowledge. In other
words, professional/bureaucratic conflict manifests
itself in the opposition of interests concerning
expansion, restriction, or application of resources,
and over the right to define organizational realities,
[p. 313].
Consequently, disputes over authority and control are
likely to always be present in the hospital. Much of the
literature suggests negotiation and cooperation as remedies
for these difficulties. However, these terms are prescrip-
tions for organizational discord, not descriptive of how
coordination is realized. Authority and control relation-
ships within the hospital are not static. Rather, they are
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constantly undergoing change as the power, influence, and
values of the principal organizational players are altered.




IV. POWER AND INFLUENCE BASES
It is hypothesized that the structural characteristics
exhibited in the "professional bureaucracy" will have a
marked effect on the social structure of the hospital, and
consequently, on the interactions within the institution.
In a hospital the "general goal of the organization specifies
an area of activity instead of a specific activity and
therefore is subject to wide differences in specific inter-
pretations." [Thompson ^ Bates 1957, p. 329]. Assuming the
truth of this statement, one could expect that a lack of
specific objectives will lead to disagreements over choice
of tasks to be performed, resource allocation, and the
distribution of authority and status.
Bucher and Stelling [1969] have stated that the "question
of which persons and groups influence the setting of goals
and practices in the hospital points to a complex and prob-
ably fluid phenomenon. Power to determine policy is not
clearly located in specific positions. It is more diffuse,
and the locus and balance of power often shifts in response
to different issues and as different persons and groups move
through the organization." [p. 11].
As Ginzberg [1977] has asserted:
With regard to decision-making mechanisms, it is
important to note that although governance can alter
the flow of funds into the system, select the targets
to which they are directed, influence the production
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and allocation of health manpower, and promulgate rules
for quality assurance, the effective transformation of
the health care delivery system depends on the behavior
of individuals and groups in specific locations, [p. 213].
One of the major underlying themes of the hospital liter-
ature is the need for integration between clinical and
administrative decision-making. Shortell [1974] believes
that the key to such integration lies in the relationship
of authority and power in the institution. He defines power
as influence accruing to the individual, while authority is
derived from the organization.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine some of the
power and influence bases that are used by trustees, admin-
istrators, and physicians. As hospital costs rise and funds
become scarce, power and influence increase in importance as
determinants of resource allocation. When the environment
of an organization has plentiful resources, institutional
conflict tends to be minimized. There are sufficient monies,
manpower, and equipment to satisfy all requests. However,
as resources dwindle, competition for these resources becomes
intensified.
With the foundation of bureaucratic and professional
organizational characteristics in mind, this chapter focuses
on the types and degrees of influence that various members
of the hospital can exert in justifying their claim for
5 authority, control, and resources.
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A. CONTROL AND CONFLICT
"Only the uninitiated believe that the organizational
chart shows where the power actually lies in a specific
hospital." [Viguers 1978, p. 40].
The hospital has been described as an organization
consisting of multiple, and often conflicting, goals. It
is hypothesized that this characteristic is derived from
corresponding incongruencies in individual interests, values,
powers, and influences. For most hospitals, perhaps the
determination of goals is a function of the bargaining pro-
cesses among the more powerful coalitions. [Cyert ^ iMarch
1973] .
"While formal rules and protocols exist, what actually
takes place in hospitals between administrators, medical
staff, nursing staff, other professionals, semi-professionals
and nonprofessionals, and clients is a matter of negotiation
(overt) and influence (covert negotiation)." [Croog § Ver
Steeg 1972, p. 293]. Gordon [1964] contends that:
The elements that are different in the voluntary hos-
pital organization stem not primarily from the structure,
the psychology, the human relations, and so forth. They
stem from the power relationships, the control relation-
ships and the alternatives available to each group in
what can best be described as a negotiated relationship
and one constantly subject to renegotiation. They stem
out of the alternative means of leverage and the amount
of power behind that leverage that is available to each
party in the negotiation, [p. 67].
Perrow [1963] has traced the history of organizational
control in hospitals. He found that hospitals have pro-
ceeded through four stages:
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1. Trustee domination had its roots in the tradition
of charity hospitals to serve the poor.
2. Medical domination developed as medical knowledge
increased in quantity and complexity.
3. Administrative challenge was the result of increas-
ing needs for sound management practices and cost
control.
4. Multiple leadership resulted from the effects of a
power struggle between the three groups. This
I
proved relatively ineffective in terms of long-range
planning.
As Perrow indicates, the hospital is now in stage four.
Thus, power struggles are seen as one of the most important
characteristics of the modern institution. The outcomes of
these struggles are not limited to present-day consequences
because "when decision makers in an organization allocate
I




One could argue that Perrow' s "multiple leadership"
model is a redundancy; one needs to go no further than the
introduction of stage three to realize that three separate
I
entities are intervening within the hospital. Moreover,
one may posit that the primary conflict is occurring between
"medical domination" and "administrative challenge." Cer-
tainly, if stage three was, in actuality, "administrative
domination," physicians' power would be subordinate to that
I
of hospital management.
• Before proceeding further, perhaps the physician's re-
lationships to the hospital should be explicitly detailed.
Guest [1972] summarizes these relationships as follows:
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1. The doctor was and is officially a "guest" of the
institution, but his privileges as a "guest" are being
limited by increasing pressures to conform to certain
organizational constraints of the medical staff, the hos-
pital, and third party agreements.
2. The doctor is the "independent professional," but
he is becoming increasingly interdependent in his relation-
ship to his colleagues, other professionals, the adminis-
trator, and the governing authority of the institution.
3. The doctor makes his own financial contractual
arrangements with his clients but these arrangements are
to an increasing extent preestablished in schedules set up
under health insurance. Medicare, Medicaid, and other
third-party agreements.
4. The doctor has a fundamental right to minister to
his client, the patient, but the responsibility for "total
patient treatment" appears to be shifting toward greater
involvement of other professionals, including administrators
5. The knowledge of clinical practice is "owned" by
the doctor, but the technical tools of his practice are
owned in large degree by the institution which gives him
the privilege to practice. Even the doctor's clinical
knowledge is being supplemented by specialized knowledge
of other, nonmedical, members of the institution.
6. The doctor's role as a member of the hospital organ-
ization, as distinguished from his purely professional role,
is being made increasingly explicit in bylaws of the medical
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staff and in written agreements with administrators, govern-
ing boards, and outside parties of interest.
As Guest clearly indicates, physician and hospital
interaction is highly interdependent. However, interdepen-
dence is not necessarily compatible with goal congruence.
And even in those cases where it may be, the hospital and
physician may be at odds on the means of reaching a paticu-
lar organizational objective. This is especially true in
medical care where institutional goals remain vague and
largely unmeasurable.
White [1974] suggests two methods for individuals in
organizations to realize their goals:
1. By collective decision-making on the allocation
of resources.
2. By the utilization of the resources themselves.
While the type and degree of control over the first is
primarily determined by status and influence within the
organization, White observes that all members of the insti-
tution make decisions that affect, in some sense, resource
utilization. One should note the relationship between the
two. It is of a serial rather than concurrent nature.
"Utilization of scarce resources results from a series of
allocative decisions." [p. 367]. For example, excessive
utilization of a particular piece of laboratory equipment
cannot occur unless a previous affirmative decision on the
purchase of the equipment has been made. This appears to




Although this study deals primarily with the internal
workings of the hospital, it should be remembered that ex-
ternal controls, such as certificate of need laws, usually
result from a perceived need to alter the way the hospital
operates. For example, specialization and division of labor,
previously discussed under professional and bureaucratic
characteristics, are seen by some as stimuli for external
control. Rushing [1976] observes that:
An increase in differentiation makes the actions of
personnel more difficult to anticipate; conflicting
interests emerge and social disorganization is apt to
ensue. The resulting strain may lead to a generalized
demand throughout the system for more planning, the
development of more well-defined procedures and regu-
lations, and the establishment of agencies to insure
that procedures and regulations are adhered to. [p. 679].
Georgopoulos [1972] suggests that an individual's pro-
pensity to behave in a manner consistent with organizational
objectives is dependent on two factors: (1) his expectation
that performing an activity will lead to certain consequen-
ces, or desired "payoffs"; and (2) the relative value or
attractiveness for the individual of the outcomes likely to
result from performing that activity. To the extent that
an individual perceives the outcomes as favorable, cooper-
ation will be forthcoming. However, if payoffs are deemed
negative, conflict will ensue. As each individual strives
to attain the greatest positive outcome possible, inter-
personal conflict will result.





1. Interpersonal disagreements over substantive issues,
such as policies and practices.
2. Interpersonal antagonisms when personal and emo-
tional differences arise between interdependent
human beings. [Schulz § Johnson 1971].
Gamson notes that "there may come a time in a conflict
when the perceived issues become transformed from matters
of substance [over policies, resource allocations, etc.) to
the completely different issue of the right of one of the
parties to make decisions on the substantive question. This
is what is known as a power struggle." [Murray 1974, p. 45].
Gordon's [1964] study of hospital organization suggests
that while many of the characteristics found in hospitals
are similar to those found in business and public institu-
tions, one feature appears to be unique. Although the
hospital exists primarily as a vehicle for providing health
care, the corporate entity is not allowed, either ethically
or legally, to practice medicine. This privilege belongs
solely to the physicians. This differentiation is not a
semantic exercise but rather the crux of the issue concern-
ing types and degrees of professional control. Gordon con-
cludes that: "The distinguishing characteristic of hospital
organization is not dual authority. Nor is it an academic
debate on who practices medicine. Instead, it is the free-
dom of the doctor from control by unlicensed persons over
whatever may fall or may be defined as falling within the
area of his professional functions." [pp. 63-65].
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Etzioni [1959] has suggested that line and staff rela-
tionships in the professional bureaucracy are reversed from
those normally found in industry. The managers of the
hospital provide the supporting services needed to reach
institutional goals, but the physicians carry out the actual
goal activity.
One major problem faced by hospital administrators is
their lack of control over most costs and expenditures.
These are determined by the activities of the medical staff
who admit patients, order tests and therapeutic procedures,
and try to directly influence policies of the hospital.
Hence, the administrator tends to view the medical staff
with a jaundiced eye. On the other hand, physicians tend
to focus on the unique features of each patient. They want
the hospital to provide the necessary support services when
they are needed and with a minimum of red tape. They often
are intolerant of many of the routines regarded as essential
by the administrator and frequently perceive the hospital
as frustrating therapy. "The professional dimension oper-
ates primarily in a dynamic task environment; the nonpro-
fessional dimension operates in a relatively stable task
environment reflecting the nature of its responsibilities."
[Ewell 1976, p. 21] .
Etzioni [1959] explains this organizational conflict in
terms of roles. "The role of the expert is to create and
institutionalize knowledge. The role of the manager is to
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integrate organizational systems or subsystems from the
point of view of institutional goals and needs." Conse-
quently, physicians exhibit primary allegiance to their
professional work while administrators are more committed
to the organization [p. 45]. Others see the physician/
hospital dichotomy as a separation of focus. "The split
in authority leads to problems of goal conflict, mostly
between the efforts of the medical staff to promote care
on an individual basis while the administration seeks to
promote patient care in the least expensive way." [Coe 1970,
p. 317].
Viguers [1978] concludes that power and influence within
the hospital rests with those individuals who control finan-
cial resources, medical resources, and communications. Such
control can be derived from either the formal or informal
organization. The following pages attempt to move beyond
generalities to identify the specific leverages each indi-
vidual or group in the hospital may possess.
B. TRUSTEE INFLUENCE
Power is likely to be manifested in the kinds of deci-
sions the hospital makes. Conversely, if one looks at the
types of decisions made by physicians, governing boards,
medical directors, and administrators, the degree of power
or authority held by each group may be implicitly derived.
LeRocker and Howard studied the policy decisions of trustees
in 18 New York State hospitals. They found that 50 percent
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of the decisions of hospital boards were in the area of
finance and physical plant, 24 percent in the area of per-
sonnel, 7 percent in public relations, 6 percent in hospital
organization, 5 percent in education, and only 2 percent in
patient care policy [Kovner 1974] .
It appears that trustees are able to influence decisions
that are comparable with those made in private industry, i.e.,
financial and personnel judgements. Conversely, decisions
peculiar to hospital organization appear to be outside the
governing board's province. Ewell [1976] argues that hos-
pital trustees, because of the part-time nature of their
responsibilities and lack of health care experience, are
hesitant to countermand the administrator's decisions in-
volving organizational structure. "The board's traditional
orientation is toward the financial and legal aspects of
hospital operations." [p. 22].
In relationships with the administrator, the board holds
the authority to hire and fire. However, in carrying out
the management functions of the hospital, perceptions may
vary as to the trustees' degree of control and influence.
Kaluzny and Veney [1972] conducted a study on how trustee
participation in the hospital is perceived. Both adminis-
trators and trustees were asked to rate the degree of trustee
participation in varying hospital decisions. The results





































These findings seem to indicate that administrators
perceive greater participation and influence by trustees
than do the trustees themselves.
In a somewhat conflicting study, Kovner [1974] surveyed
506 trustees in the greater Philadelphia area as to their
power to set institutional goals. He found that 92 percent
of the board members perceived that the board exclusively
or primarily established objectives, strategies, and broad
policies. However, in the same survey, 97 percent of the
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trustees said that the hospital administrator determined
to at least some extent which policy issues the board dis-
cussed. Thus, institutional control and influence by the
governing board over hospital decisions seems to be contin-
gent on trustee/administrator communication.
Some writers contend that power accrues to individual
trustees rather than to the governing board in general.
Zald [1969], commenting about the power and influence of
boards and directors, stated that: "The power of board mem-
bers relates to their service on and control of key commit-
tees and the extent to which other members and the management
find it necessary to be bound by their perspectives and
ideas." [p. 98]. Unfortunately, Zald failed to specify which
committees have the most power.
The formal authority of trustees over physicians is
similar to that exercised over administrators. Appointment
to the medical staff, the granting of privileges, and the
approval of medical staff bylaws all directly affect the
status, professional development, and earnings of the indi-
vidual physician. Significantly, all of these factors are
within the province of the governing board. Thus, the board
can exercise considerable influence on a physician's potential
achievements. It should be noted that this influence may
be tempered or enhanced by the institutional alternatives
,
available to the physician. In large metropolitan areas,
physicians are often staff members of two or more hospitals.
Hence, the power of each individual hospital board is
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diluted, and sanctions against physicians may be less
effective.
Trustee leverage in the hospital seems to be primarily
limited to approving and terminating the employment of phy-
sicians and administrators. Any additional influence on
behalf of the board is largely dependent on its collective
knowledge of the institution and how well communication is
established with its members. Gordon [1964] concludes that
:
"On a day-to-day basis, the voluntary hospital corporation
and its agents have no legal or organizational means of
controlling the service that the hospital has been set up




The practice of medicine is engaged in, not by the
hospital, but by doctors. The practice of medicine,
if it is to be controlled, under law, must be con-
trolled close to the source of information and com-
petency, not by the board and the administrator but
by licensed doctors. The board and the administration
must have: (1) the organizational means, and (2) the
interpersonal approach to hold the doctors accountable
for such control. Neither is enough alone, [p. 65].
However, some authors believe that state-of-the-art
managerial interventions are not likely to be successful in
the hospital situation because hospitals do not exhibit many
of the formal characteristics found in industrial firms
[Weisbord 1976]. Goss [1966] points out that, in the hos-
pital, to a greater extent than other social institutions.
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norms and values may set the real limits to supervisory
control as opposed to the official limits.
Georgopoulos and Mann [1962] have stated that the admin-
istratior's influence is a function of the governing board's
delegation to him. On the other hand, physicians derive
influence from their expertise, prestige, and power among
patients and the community. The authors conclude that the
administrator's influence is the stronger of the two.
As cited previously, the increasing number of hospitals
with a "chief executive officer" title rather than "admin-
istrator" or "superintendent," may be seen as a method for
increasing the administrator's influence and prestige.
Although changing the title may increase the status of the
individual inside the organization, some writers have con-
tended that the major importance of the change is to project
the status of the position to outside people [Wren 5 Hilgers
1974] .
Previous mention was also made of communications between
boards and administrators. Similar studies have been con-
ducted on physician-administrator interaction. To determine
which elements of the medical staff communicated most fre-
quently with the administrator, Gottlieb [1975] designed a
study around the organizational status of physicians. He
assigned medical staff to one of three categories.
1. High Organizational Status: Medical Director, Chief
of Staff, officers of the medical staff, members of




2. Medium Organizational Status: Departmental educa-
tional chiefs, and in-house specialists.
3. Low Organizational Status: None of the above.
It should be noted that all of the hospitals studied
were in excess of 500 beds so that a representative medical
staff could be surveyed, Gottlieb determined that, with a
few exceptions, administrator interaction was confined to
those physicians with high organizational status. This would
seem to indicate that the administrator uses his authority
and influence from a hierarchical perspective, working
through medical staff representatives rather than the medical
staff as a whole.
Perrow's "multiple leadership" model was discussed ear-
lier. It was hypothesized that the principal power struggles
occur between administrators and medical staff. The hospital
literature tends to back up this assertion; the great pre-
ponderance of articles dealing with administrative power
contrast physician-administrator influences within the hos-
pital. For example, Bates and White [1961] conducted a study
of thirteen upstate New York hospitals. They surveyed board
members, administrators, and physicians as to what authority
each of them should have in making various hospital decisions.
The questionnaire consisted of hypothetical situations aris-
ing in the institution. They found that some areas, such as
'the medical staff's prerogative to determine patient treat-
ment, were generally agreed upon. In other areas, such as
patient scheduling, more than one group perceived themselves
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as preeminent. The major differences in the perception of
authority occurred between administrators and physicians.
Wilson [1966] , in discussing changes in the traditional
roles within the hospital, has shown that the rise of hospital
administration to the status of a profession has resulted
in strains and in readjustments in the nature of work and
authority relationships between doctors and administrators.
"In business, prestige and power normally go to the admin-
istrative group, the paper workers who make the plans and
initiate the activities of others. Production workers have
lower status. In the hospital the honor and glory go to the
production worker, namely, the doctors." [Lentz 1957, p.
460] .
Some have suggested that the administrator is dependent
upon the cooperation of the medical staff for his power and
when this support is lacking the administrator will be inef-
fective [Viguers 1978]. It appears that when medical staff-
administrator differences become intolerable, administrators
are expendable while the medical staff is not. Thus, "The
relative power of the administrator will be increased to the
extent that he influences the outcome of who occupies, or
does not occupy, key positions in the medical staff hier-
archy and on medical staff committees." [Kovner 1978, p. 89].
O'Connor [1978] believes that the power of administrators
has increased in direct proportion to the number of outside
' agencies that the hospital must deal with. He assumes that
administrators and regulatory agencies share the same concern
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with cost control, and therefore the chief executive can ally
himself with a governmental powerbase in his conflicts with
the medical staff. While cost control is seen as a legiti-
mate concern of the administrator, he lacks the authority
to direct physicians to order fewer tests and perform fewer
procedures. Rather, the administrator can attempt to influ-
ence the medical staff to develop and implement guidelines
for controlling these functions in the hospital. Conse-
quently, success rests more on the administrator's influence
than on hierarchical relationships. Kovner [1978] concludes
that the administrator's only formal authority and influence
on cost control is, at least potentially, exercised in the
budgetary process.
Green's [1975] study revealed that much of the conflict
in hospitals occurs between subsets of physicians rather
than between physicians and administrators. However, the
administrator could not remain a disinterested bystander.
He usually found himself courted by both opposing sides and
forced to take a stand. Consequently, he invariably found
himself allied with some physicians and opposed to others.
Therefore, the administrator may be viewed as functioning
in a "boundary role," one that arbitrates various conflicts
within the hospital [Schulz § Johnson 1971].
Etzioni [1975] stresses that the power of the adminis-
trator is mostly determined by the quantity of influence
that other parties in the hospital can bring to bear upon
him. Consequently, to understand the administrator's
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function in the hospital depends on the ability to identify
the "coefficients of strength of the various groups" [p.
281] . It is hypothesized that the medical staff is the most
powerful of these groups. For a discussion of their influ-
ences, we turn to the following section.
D. PROFESSIONAL LEVERAGE
According to Green: "Doctors have been crucially involved
in the determination of the structure and their position in
the organization. They lie in the adjustable bed which they
helped to make." [p. 124].
Specialized clinical procedures are no longer simply a
matter of a physician deciding on a new course of drug
therapy or of performing a surgical operation in a
different manner. What was once a physician's exclusive
decision now becomes a matter requiring building changes,
training of personnel, and a considerable investment in
new equipment. [Johnson 1970, p. 21].
Much of the professional status of the physician is
independent of the hospital. In general, the individual
physician does not need a hospital to work with and through
,
but rather to work in. If hospitals could not provide the
means for the medical staff to practice medicine, physicians
would have no need of them [Bennett 1971]
.
Even now, a significant portion of the physician's work
is accomplished outside of the hospital, where professional
autonomy remains largely undiminished.
Mayhew [1971] has written that: "Physicians are an out-
side agency from the standpoint of hospital organization
and are the gatekeepers who regulate the volume of hospital
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activity." [p . 28]. Perhaps the appropriate view of the
hospital-physician relationship is that the hospital is
part of the physician's practice rather than the physician
being a part of the hospital [Freidson 1970B]
.
The charisma of physicians has been generalized to many
situations in the hospital setting in which the rational
authority of the administration is more appropriate, thus
making the medical staff a very powerful and influential
group in the hospital [Georgopoulos § Mann 1962] . Physicians
often argue that: "Even when general scientific knowledge
may be available, the mere fact of individual variability
poses a constant problem for assessment that emphasizes the
necessity for personal first hand examination of every indi-
vidual case and the difficulty of disposition on some formal,
abstract scientific basis." [Freidson 1970B, p. 164].
Reiff [1974] believes that "the basis of professional
power is not knowledge itself, but the control of knowledge."
However, in addition to control of professional knowledge,
he argues that physicians also expropriate knowledge on
nonprofessional matters. "This includes large segments of
intuition, common sense, and cultural and moral values.
They aggrandize nonprofessional knowledge, giving it the
trappings of professional knowledge." Consequently, the
influence given to physicians is greater than is warranted
by their medical proficiency [pp. 451-453]. As Weisbord
[1976] has noted, "It is not necessary to demonstrate
77

competence in working with others, nor an understanding of
organizational complexity to achieve status in medicine.
Once technical competence is certified, all else is assumed."
[p. 25].
Freidson [1970B] hypothesizes that the physician's power
and influence in the hospital is directly proportional to
his ability to justify, rightly or wrongly, a critical
emergency. At its ultimate, this tactic is known as the
"Golden Scope Syndrome." The physician marches into the
administrator's office and informs him that: "Unless you
purchase the new model golden scope immediately, 13 people
will die needlessly by the end of the month." Thus, for
example, surgeons and cardiologists have more power than
dermatologists and pathologists.
The physician's claim to independence may be reinforced
through the traditional "physician-patient" relationship.
For many years the vast majority of medical care was pro-
vided in the physician's home or office. Responsibility
was imbedded primarily in the doctor's duty to help the
patient. This was the first consideration and nothing was
permitted to intervene. As physicians have moved into the
hospital, they have attempted to retain this basic relation-
ship. The institution, with its rules and regulations, is
seen as secondary in importance [Guest 1972].
|- It appears from the literature that, although the
physician may not always be able to control the terms of

his work, he is free to control the content. As Freidson
[1970A] has pointed out: "It seems to be assumed that tech-
nical expertise, unlike 'arbitrary' administrative authority,
is in some way neutrally functional and therefore so self-
evidently true as to automatically produce cooperation or
obedience in others as well as the efficient attainment of
ends." [p. 130].
Physicians increase their power within the organization
by retaining the right of self -evaluation. Many of the
recent legislative and regulatory mechanisms have focused
on this control. "The presumption that the interests of
the providers are synonymous with those of the recipients
of medical care no longer underlies new legislation."
[O'Connor 1978, p. 276]. Whether or not such legislation
improves quality of care or prevents waste of resources is
debatable. It seems that evaluation of care has merely
moved from an individual basis to a collective one. Physi-
cians are not likely to question an individual practitioner's
decisions except in extreme cases. Conversely, physicians
are thought to be reluctant to voice disagreement against
any decision that is supported by doctors in general. Evans
[1977] has termed this characteristic the "huddle complex."
[p. 32].
One study indicated that physicians in a hierarchical
position within the institution identified two supervisory
relationships: (1) the right to make decisions; and (2)
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the right to give advice. The first consisted of those
decisions that were administrative in nature while the second
related to medical care choices. The investigator concluded
that "the latter indirect process represents an institution-
alized form of exercising influence; advice was given which,
according to the norms of the physicians, might legitimately
be rejected by the recipients. In contrast, the direct pro-
cess represents the exercise of authority; supervisory deci-
sions were made which, however phrased, ordinarily could not
be rejected legitimately by those whose actions they concerned."
[Goss 1966, pp. 425-429]. Freidson and Rhea [1972] conclude
that, as far as peer review is concerned, "technical perfor-
mance by physicians goes generally unobserved, and, even if
observed, uncommunicated, and, even if communicated, uncon-
trolled." [p. 196].
The preceding paragraphs have focused on the power of
physicians in terms of their control of knowledge, both pro-
fessional and nonprofessional, and their right of self-evalu-
' ation. These influence bases are supported by circumstances
external to the hospital organization. The most notable of
these external forces is the American Medical Association
CAMA) . The AiMA provides physicians with a nationally oriented
power block to influence legislation. Since the AMA is struc-
tured through state medical organizations, an individual
I
hospital has great difficulty in countering its influence.
Moreover, the AMA is heavily involved in overseeing licensure
of physicians, which limits access to the profession. On the
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hospital level, such control is manifested by a sociological
phenomenon known as "blocked mobility." That is, individuals
cannot be promoted from one occupational level to another
without undergoing further formal training outside the organ-
ization [Smith 1955]. Consequently, physicians are somewhat
protected from intrusions of differing values and goals by
other members of the institution.
Organizationally, physicians are now occupying some posi-
tions outside their traditional medical staff orientation.
Some writers see the physician's increasing acceptance on the
governing board as a merging of institutional interests. The
physician is perceived as a trustee first and a doctor second.
However, others have pointed out that the physician wants
membership on the governing board because he has a fundamental
distrust of both the governing board and the administrator.
Thus, membership is sought to protect their own interests
[Schulz 5 Johnson 1976]. Mansfield's [1972B] study indicated
that administrators were overwhelmingly pleased (93.3%) with
physician membership on governing boards. The board itself
was pleased in 88.61 of the responses while the medical staff
was least pleased C66.5%). Significantly, the medical staff's
displeasure resulted from perceived under-representation on
the board.
Likewise, the position of medical director is perceived
from various viewpoints. While a "company man" on the organ-
izational chart, the degree to which he can integrate profes-
sional and administrative functions is problematic.
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Perhaps the medical director position has evolved from the
belief that physicians understand each other and that they
will accept from one of their peers what they would not
accept from an outsider.
In summary, one is likely to find agreement with the
proposition that hospitals exist to serve patients. However,
patients are not able to request hospital services on their
own initiative. The decision to hospitalize and draw on the
institution's resources belongs to the physician. Consequently,
administrators and governing boards must concentrate on satis-
fying physicians first and patients second. Perhaps the
physician's right to determine access to the hospital is his
most important power of all.
E. SUMMARY
Power is the ability to make or influence important deci-
sions. This chapter has described the types and degrees of
leverage that are possessed by governing boards, administra-
tors, and physicians. Although recognizing that the deter-
mination of power and authority relationships in a particular
institution is empirical in nature, many of the issues dis-
cussed are applicable to a majority of hospitals.
The significant influence bases within the hospital can
be summarized as follows:
1. Governing Boards
a. Legitimate authority over the institution.
b. Expertise on financial and legal affairs.




. Appoint physicians to staff and approve privileges.
2. Administrator
a. Control over information flows.
b. Control over support services, including both
nonprofessional personnel and equipment.
c. Knowledge of budgetary techniques and processes.
d. Familiarity with outside agencies.
e. Some ability to influence which physicians hold
positions in the medical staff hierarchy.
3. Physicians
a. Source of patients.
b. Professional knowledge and technical competence.
c. Ability to define emergencies.
d. Institutionalization of sacred patient-physician
relationship
.
e. Professional control of performance evaluation.
f. Initiator of resource utilization.
g. AMA affiliation.
h. Membership on governing boards.
One may have noted the absence of medical directors in
the above listing. No slight was intended. The power and
influence of directors has not been broached in current hos-
pital literature. The few articles which have dealt with the
director tend to focus on cooperation and coordination with
the administrator. Perhaps the relative newness of the posi-
tion in the hospital accounts for the paucity of information.
At any rate, a medical director's power in a particular hos-
pital is no doubt ascertainable, but to attempt a generaliza-




In order to study the decision-making process in the
hospital, it is first necessary to examine the purposes and
goals of the hospital and to determine who has the most in-
fluence in the establishment of them. The approach used in
the research for this chapter was to review hospital litera-
ture that dealt with purposes, goals, and objectives of
hospitals and those who work in them. The majority of the
literature was very general in nature and leads to the con-
clusion that health care goals tend to be vague, unmeasurable,
and lacking in specificity. This chapter is an attempt to
review the many different viewpoints on health care and hos-
pital goals and reach some conclusions on the goals which are
motivating the decision-makers in our hospitals.
Everyone employed in a health care organization needs
something to believe in, some specific purposes and goals to
work for. Because of the complex, multidisciplinary charac-
teristics of a hospital, it is imperative that the efforts
of its people be directed toward goals, rather than functions
[Bennett 1976J . What are the goals of a hospital and by what
or whom are they set? Anthony and Herzlinger [1975] state
that a goal is a "... statement of intended output in the
broadest terms." [p. 133J . Since hospital goals cannot
usually be measured quantitatively, it is often difficult to
determine whether the intended output was actually achieved.
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Therefore, goals are normally used more as a statement of
purpose or aims, to establish relative priorities of the
organization, and to provide general guidance as to the
strategy that the organization is expected to follow.
Specific goals supply the criteria by means of which the
organization's structure may be rationally designed: they
specify what tasks are to be performed, what kinds of per-
sonnel are to be hired, and how resources are to be allocated
among participants. That virtually every organization theor-
ist insists on the importance of specific goals as a defining
criterion of organizations is not surprising. However, the
goals of most professional organizations, such as medical
institutions or universities, are notoriously lacking in pre-
cision. A major difficulty, as indicated by Hall [1973], is
that the measurement of effectiveness against goals may not
recognize the presence of multiple, and frequently conflict-
ing, goals within organizations. Thus, effectiveness in
meeting one goal may, in fact, lead to ineffectiveness rela-
tive to other goals. This is more likely to occur in an
organization like a hospital that is multi-purpose in orien-
tation.
Many factors affect the ability of an organization to
achieve its goals. Internally there may be a lack of harmony;
members of the institution may be unclear as to its goals;
there may be conflicts between goals; or there may be other
and numerous internal forces. On the other hand, environ-
mental conditions may also influence effectiveness.
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Competition with other organizations, changing societal
definitions of goals, shifts in the legitimacy granted to
an institution, and general economic and cultural conditions
can influence the organization's attainment of objectives
directly or through their influence on support [Elling §
Halebsky 1961]
.
According to Simon [1964], it is doubtful that decisions
are generally directed toward achieving a goal. It is easier,
and clearer, to view decisions as being concerned with dis-
covering courses of action that satisfy a whole set of con-
straints. It is this set, and not any one of its members,
that is most accurately viewed as the goal of the organization.
Perrow [1961] has classified goals as either official or
operational. The official goals are those more apt to be
found in the hospital charter and would provide general or-
ganizational purposes. The operative goals are the results
of daily operating decisions and practices. The official
goal for a hospital may be to deliver general health care
services to the local population, while the operative goals
are reflected in the amount of resources committed to certain
facilities and activities.
The three most common goals probably held by society for
hospitals are:
1. The delivery of medical care efficiently and econom-
ically.
2. Improved access to care for disadvantaged members of
the population.
3. Improving and maintaining the quality of care.
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A. HOSPITAL GOALS MODELS
Roos, et al . [1974J, have suggested two hospital goals




This model emphasizes that hospitals with different
structures will pursue different goals. Certainly, one would
assume that hospitals with different ownership structures
would perform differently. Private, proprietary hospitals
usually pursue efficiency and revenue generating activities
in order to make a profit. Voluntary, non-profit hospitals
usually pursue the goal of delivering high quality care.
Government or public "owned" hospitals normally pursue the
goal of providing access to care regardless of the ability to
pay [p. 79]. The structure-specialization model implicitly
assumes that quality, efficiency, and access are basically
incompatible goals. Efficiency is seen to come only at the
expense of lowering quality, while an emphasis on providing
access is incompatible with providing high quality care.
2 Exchange Model
The exchange model emphasizes the relationship between
the hospital and its environment. Each provide essential in-
puts for the other. Society exchanges resources for health
services. Hospitals are dependent on four basic types of
inputs: (1) doctors; (2) patients; (3) patient- support ; and
(4) capital funds for equipment and construction. Thus, the
nature of the environmental influences on hospitals' operative
goals would be expected to vary from one type of institution
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to the next as the mix of suppliers of basic resource inputs
vary. Probably the most significant input for the hospital
is the physician, and since the hospital is almost totally
dependent upon the community's physicians to be the attending
staff, it will reflect to a great extent the personal goals
of the community physicians. Hospitals have traditionally
been characterized as the "physician's workshop," a place
where the physician comes to administer care to individual
patien'ts. The hospital provides facilities and conditions
which the physician is incapable of providing in the normal
office. A recent trend is the decline in the percentage of
physicians in office-based practice. From 1963 to 1973, the
percentage of physicians in office-based practice fell from
68.61 to 59.6%. [Trends 1976].
B. HOSPITAL OBJECTIVES
Karen Davis [1972] has done research in an attempt to
determine the financial objective of a non-profit hospital.
Her study dealt with five likely hypotheses:
1. Recovery of Costs
In this case the hospital will charge a price for a
service equal to the average cost of providing that service.
In addition, it will add a percentage mark-up to allow for




Under this hypothesis the hospital will attempt to
maximize the number of patients it will see subject to some
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constraints, one of its constraints being that its budget
deficit cannot exceed specified limits.
3
.
Quality and Quantity Maximization
This type of hospital is likely to provide a lower
quantity of care than a quantity maximizing hospital. But
it will use more inputs in producing any given level of care
than a quantity maximizing hospital. This hospital is subject
to a break-even constraint.
4. Utility Maximization
This occurs when hospital administrators seek to max-
imize their own utility; their utility being a function of
the size of the hospital, the amount of modern equipment, and
the professional prestige of physicians of the hospital staff.
5 Cash Flow Maximization
In this hypothesis the hospital will seek to maximize
the difference between revenue and out-of-pocket expenses.
An excess of funds over costs is desired so that additional
facilities may be continuously added without the necessity of
relying on gifts, government funds, or borrowed funds. This
hypothesis also predicts that the hospital will make a profit.
The basic assumption has always been that those who
control major decisions in non-profit hospitals pursue goals
other than profit maximization. However, the evidence that
was collected indicated that non-profit revenues exceeded non-
profit expenses every year from 1961 to 1969, except for 1962.
Net incomes during this same period rose from $91 million to
$400 million. Net income per patient day climbed from 71(^ in
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1961 to $2.34 in 1969. The conclusion is that non-profit
hospitals do make a profit and in fact these profits are
increasing over time,
C. HOSPITAL OBJECTIVE FUNCTION
Berki [1972] states that the hospital is a complex organ-
ization that is attempting to maximize its objective function.
As to what the objective function may be, it cannot be defined
in terms of profit maximization as with other firms. Instead,
it appears that the "... physician's decision-making role in
the medical care process and the hospital's constituencies'
desire for prestige are the important if not unique determin-
ants of its objective function." [p. 19].
The following four functions have been suggested for a
hospital:
1. To provide medical care for those that require it.
2. To assure medical education and the maintenance of
acceptable medical standards in the community it
serves
.
3. To provide preventive medicine and promote good health.
4. To encourage continuing medical research.
Long and Feldstein have suggested that the objective of
the hospital is to optimize some complex, differing, and ill-
defined goal subject to financial constraints [Berki 1972].
Reder includes the physician in his suggestion that the
objective is "... to maximize the weighted number of patients
treated (per period of time), the 'weights' being the profes-




It can also be suggested that the individual prestige o£ the
doctor can be used as an indicator of the level of quality
of care he can provide.
If the hospital's goals are specified in terms of quality,
an effective constraint on expenditure will be the only limit
to the amount of funds that it will devote to the pursuit of
those goals. Baumol and Bowen, in their study of non-profit
firms, conclude that "... the objectives of the typical non-
profit organization are by their very nature designed to keep
it constantly on the brink of financial catastrophe, for to
such a group the quality of services which it provides becomes
an end in itself .... These goals constitute bottomless recep-
tacles into which limitless funds can be poured" [Berki,
1972]. The objectives of the hospital are strongly influenced
by the physician if he is seeking to maximize his income. He
would have every incentive to push for increases in capital
investment in facilities that would, in turn, increase his
own productivity which in the end would increase his personal
income. Berki [1972] proposes that the physician is the
originator of most of the demands for hospital services;
therefore, whether they seek to maximize their income through
increased facilities or shape the hospital to their own needs,
the physician, as the central decision-maker in the delivery
of medical care, will make every effort to shape the hospital's
objective function for his own purposes.
The only point in which there seems to be agreement in
the hospital literature is that the objectives of a hospital
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are vague, ill-defined, contradictory, and sometimes appar-
ently non-existent. There is support for quantity and
quality being in the hospital's goal set and that it is the
physician who, to a great extent, can control or at least
strongly influence both of these factors.
D. PHYSICIAN GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
A major goal for the hospital is to cater to the desires
of the medical staff. Physicians will bring patients to the
hospital available to them that offers the best facilities.
When similarly equipped hospitals compete for doctors, the
enterprising hospital will emphasize the features that it has
that will insure the physician's comfort, convenience, and
deference. The physician will want the hospital to be con-
venient to him and his patient. He wants easy patient
admittance and professional freedom and will avoid anything
resembling socialized or corporate practice of medicine
I
[Roemer § Friedman 1971]
.
Pauly and Redisch [1973] have hypothesized a model that
is probably more in line with reality. Under their model, it
is the physician who is maximizing profits. They suppose
that the non-profit hospital is started by two groups: the
physician and the equity holders (.trustees) . In this hospital
(there are residual profits, but these profits go to the phy-
t sicians instead of to the equity holders. To answer the
question of why trustees would start this hospital and incur
these costs, Pauly and Redisch [1973J point out that those
who provide equity capital for a non-profit hospital must
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"... be motivated by a desire on the part of contributors
to make output available to themselves or those whom they
would like to see consume it." [p. 98]. Their model has been
criticized for leaving out any complete analysis on the be-
havior of trustees and concentrating only on physician
behavior.
Pauly and Redisch [1973] assume a sort of group goal for
the physicians on the medical staff of the hospital. They
state, "... that the physicians on the staff of a hospital
at any point in time act in such a way as to maximize the sum
of the money incomes of all staff members." [p. 89]. Regard-
ing the size of hospitals, the model would predict that in a
period of rising prices hospitals would tend to be small for
two reasons. One is that smallness would tend to maximize
the net income per physician while at the same time allowing
for coordination among the medical staff.
A model presented by Buchanan and Lindsay [1970] explores
the two lines of authority that are present in the hospital
and the conflict that must arise between administrative and
medical decisions. The outcome of the conflict supports the
supposition that it is the physician who usually comes out
ahead in any disagreement. The two lines of authority and
the resulting conflict exists between the hospital adminis-
trator and the physician, since the trustee is assumed to
have very little control over the daily operation of the
hospital. The administrator is seen as having very little
incentive in opposing the physician; indeed, his own job
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security depends rather heavily on how well he can recruit
and maintain a content medical staff. This allows us to
conclude that the hospital will be run in the physicians'
favor since collectively they will be the dominant factor
in its operation. Thus, since the physician has little
direct incentive to keep hospital costs down, he will receive
very little opposition to his demands of more expensive equip-
ment and staff slack so that he can economize his own time,
thereby allowing him to increase his own income. The fact
that physicians' fees rose nearly 168% from 1950 to 1974
while the CPI rose only 98%, tends to support the hypothesis
of the physician as an income maximizer [Trends 1976]
.
E. GOAL SETTING AND SUBGOALS
Perhaps for the majority of medical organizations the
most satisfactory answer to the question of who sets goals
is that goals emerge from a continual bargaining process
among shifting coalitions of the more powerful participants
[Cyert § March 1963] . The fierceness with which coalitions
bargain is clearly affected by the state of the organization
as a whole. If times are good and the organization is fat
with resources, the several groups can afford to be generous
in the bargains they strike; competing and even conflicting
goals may be simultaneously pursued. However, in those lean
times when the organization is forced to struggle for its
very survival, hard bargaining takes place with the result
that the desires of weaker groups are sacrificed.
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A vexing problem is faced by organizations insofar as
they parcel general goals into subgoals and delegate these
subgoals to particular individuals or departments. In such
cases--and they are very frequent in most organizations-
-
what is delegated as a goal or end to the department is for
the organization only a means for attaining a more general
objective. For example, within a hospital, a goal for the
radiology department- -processing and interpreting X-rays-
-
is only a means to attain a more general obj ective- -arriving
at a definitive diagnosis. Certain cognitive and motivational
factors conduce participants to pursue their particular sub-
goals in ways which are not always consistent with the goal
attainment efforts of related departments or of the organi-
zation as a whole. Thus, March and Simon [1958] note that a
given participant assigned a subgoal will, because of the
process of selective perception and rationalization, focus
exclusively on attaining this objective without regard to the
possibly negative consequences for the larger system to which
his actions are supposed to contribute. These individual
tendencies are reinforced both by the content of in-group
communications and by the selective exposure of his depart-
ment to stimuli from the larger organizational environment.
One characteristic of medical organizations encourages
subgoal formation while another mitigates its negative conse-
quences. The feature conducive to subgoal formation is the
pleth.ora of specialty groups brought together under a single
organizational canopy. Such skilled occupational groups have
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a trained incapacity to see situations in which they are
involved from any perspective other than their own. They
tend to exaggerate the importance of their own endeavors and
see their own skills and standards as applicable to virtually
every circumstance encountered. The organizational character-
istic which helps to neutralize the negative consequences of
subgoal formation is the type of departmental specialization
which tends to predominate in medical organizations: most
departments exhibit "parallel" rather than "interdependent"
specializations. Parallel departments perform specialized
but relatively independent functions; e.g., the departments
of pediatrics and geriatrics. Interdependent departments
perform specialized and interrelated functions; e.g., the
departments of medicine and radiology or pathology. To the
degree that departments are organized to function relatively
autonomously of the rest of the organization, the negative
effects of subgoal formation among departments will be mini-
mized. However, as medical technology becomes more complex
and medical specialty groups more specialized, parallel
department organization is giving way to a more interdependent
structure. The more pronounced these changes, the more dele-
terious the consequences of subgoal formation for the achieve-
ment of general organizational goals [Blau 5 Richard 1962]
.
While each health care organization adopts its own model
of establishing corporate guides and policies, the one re-
quirement that remains constant is that the development and
articulation of institutional goals and purposes must reflect
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an open and deliberate attention to the ends for which
suitable strategies for results can be fittingly designed
and toward which cooperative organizational efforts can be
directed. What, in fact, is being experienced, as this
requirement is satisfied, is the initial impact of manage-
ment as it sets forth clearly, and decides firmly, where it
wants to go and how it intends to get on with what needs to
be accomplished.
F . SUMMARY
This chapter has reviewed the goals, objectives, and
objective function of hospitals and the influences on the
setting of goals. The literature is not highly developed
on these topics and most discussions of them were in general
terms. However, there was one point throughout the litera-
ture on which there seemed to be very little disagreement:
the physician is the central figure in any discussion about
the goals of hospitals today. The physician is the dominant
factor in the medical care process; he determines the input
to the hospital and oversees the process within the hospital.
The hospital, like any other organization, has the goal
of producing an output. The problem in the hospital industry,
though, is that it is unable to determine if, or measure how
much output, it has produced. Even if the hospital's output
is simply defined as "good health," how does one measure the
amount that the hospital has produced? Therefore, the hos-
pital is faced with finding some surrogate that it can measure
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in order to have some measure of success. We discovered
that some hospitals measure the amount of revenue they gen-
erate as an indicator of efficient delivery of health care.
Others may measure the amount of deficit as an indicator of
high quality care. While still another may measure how well
it deals with its environment. One fact is certain: there
is no guaranteed measure of goal achievement in hospitals
today.
When examining the objectives of the hospital, we found
that most are concerned with making a profit and expanding
capital facilities. In fact, the term "non-profit" seems to
apply on paper only. Again, we find the physician in a
central role in the hospital's objectives, especially if he
is interested in maximizing his own income.
It proved difficult to find any literature on the goals
of the different decision-makers in the hospital. Very little
was said about the administrator except that his biggest goal
may be the satisfaction of the medical staff, while the
trustees' goal may be providing care for the community. Both
may also have a goal that they share with the physician- - the
goal of prestige in being associated with a particular hospital
that is looked on as being "successful." Several authors saw
the physician as having the goals of income maximization,
professional recognition by his peers, and respect in the com-
munity. In the next chapter we will see how the goals of the
various members of the hospital affect their decisions and




This chapter will deal with the decision-making process
within the hospital and its relationship to the costs of
resources allocated in the delivery o£ medical care. The
purpose of reviewing the current literature on the decision-
making process is to determine where the major resource
allocation decisions are made and who makes them. This
review will be from the viewpoint of whose decisions affect
the utilization of resources the most and what is, or can be,
done to control the costs involved.
The first section of this chapter will deal with estab-
lishing a definition of decision-making and the elements of
a decision. Since there are many texts written on the sub-
ject of decision-making in general, it will only be reviewed
very briefly in this section. The next section will look at
the general environment of medical care decisions and the
various decision-makers involved. The last section will
cover the results of studies that were done on the effect
certain decision-makers in the hospital have on costs and
their general knowledge about costs.
A. GENERAL DECISION-MAKING
To study the decision-making process, it is first neces-
sary to define a decision and the elements in the decision-
making process. Turban and Meredith [1977] define a decision
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as "... the conclusion of a process by which one chooses
between two or more available alternative courses of action
for the purpose of attaining a goal(s)." [p. 14].
Thompson [1967] states that, "Decision issues always in-
volve two major dimensions: (1) beliefs about cause/effect
relations, and (2) preferences regarding possible outcomes."
[p. 134]. He does not imply that both of these dimensions
are considered consciously in every discretionary situation,
but that both are operating at some level. He calls these
two dimensions the "basic variables" of a decision. With
each variable there can be assigned a certain degree of
certainty or uncertainty. When drawn in a matrix, it gives
the four types of decision issues:
Figure 3










It should be clear that in each case a different type
I' of strategy is necessary in making a decision. When there
is certainty about the causal relations and possible out-
comes, then all that is necessary is a computational strategy
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This type of decision is ideal for programming application
onto a computer. When the outcome preference is certain but
the causal relations are uncertain, then a judgmental stra-
tegy is called for in reaching a decision. The opposite
situation of certain causal relations but uncertain outcome
preferences calls for a compromise strategy. When there is
uncertainty in both dimensions, then inspirational strategy
jj
is necessary for reaching a decision if indeed any decision
can be reached.
We can observe the physician using judgmental strategy
to a great extent when the outcome preference is known (a
i "well" patient) , but the cause/effect relationship of a med-
ication on the patient is relatively uncertain. If it were
possible to define and measure health and the cause/effect
t
" relationships of various inputs into health care were known
with a high degree of certainty, then the various decision-
makers involved in the health care delivery system could
apply computational strategy in arriving at decisions on
health care. Decision-makers must be careful to avoid
applying the wrong or inappropriate strategy, i.e., using
computational strategy when the situation calls for judg-
mental or compromise strategy.
Young [1965] observes that decision-making is carried
out at all levels of management and stated: "It is not the
function of top management to solve all problems or make all
decisions. Their fundamental obligation is to supervise the
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decision-making activities of their immediate subordinates
in the middle and lower levels of management in order to
assure that their activities are being performed properly."
[pp. 38-39].
Decision-making is dynamic and, as a result, an action-
oriented process instead of one that is static. This is
especially true in a health care facility where many of the
departments interact with each other. The delivery of medi-
cal care in one department is often dependent upon the degree
of performance of members of many other departments. This
results in a chain reaction of decision-making effectiveness
that is highly unique in the health care field. Decision-
making is a continuous process. Once a decision has been
made the process does not simply stop, but instead the deci-
sion must be implemented and, of course, during implementa-
tion decisions will also have to be made to assure that the
original decision is being carried out [Rakich, et al., 1977],
.Rakich [1977] has grouped decisions into four general
classification sets as follows: CI) individual-group; (2)
ends-means; (3) administrative-operational; C^) programmed-
nonprogrammed decisions. They are not mutually exclusive
but overlap. Each set is described as follows:
1. Individual -Group
There are basically two ways in which decisions are
made, by an individual or by a group. Although group deci-
sion-making is sometimes appropriate, it can often lead to
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a decision that is not optimal. Most health care facilities
are structured so that certain individuals have the respon-
sibility for a specific area and as such are responsible
for the decisions made in those areas. However, the delivery
of health care itself can be more characterized as group
input to decision-making since the dynamics of patient care




"Ends" decisions are those that deal with the deter-
mination of the objectives, i.e., what are the objectives
("ends") to be accomplished. "Means" decisions are those
that deal with the strategy that will be involved in reach-
ing the objective. The "ends" decisions for the organization
as a whole are normally set by the board of trustees, with
the "means" decisions usually set by the chief executive
officer. Both have a major impact in terms of the input
resources required by and activities that will occur in the
organization. A department head will also make ends-means
decisions in his area of control that will hopefully con-
tribute towards the primary ends-means of the organization
as a whole.
3 Administrative -Operational
Administrative decisions are those that are made by
those individuals that occupy top level positions in the
organization. These decisions, along with ends-means, have
a significant impact on the organization and involve .^
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substantial resources. These could be decisions such as:
contracting for certain services; adding or deleting units;
sharing services; or expanding services. Operational deci-
sions are those which concern the day-to-day operation of
the facility. These are usually made by department heads,
heads of services, and supervisors. These may include
decisions such as departmental equipment requirements, per-
sonnel assignment, and departmental routine or procedures.
4. Programmed- Nonprogrammed
These decisions occur at both the administrative and
operational levels of the organization. Programmed decisions
are those that are repetitive and routine in nature. These
can often be covered by departmental or organizational pro-
cedure manuals that set forth the policy in dealing with a
certain situation. Personnel policies, patient care proced-
ures, and billing procedures are some examples of this type
of decision. A nonprogrammed decision is one that may occur
only once and therefore is a unique situation that cannot be
planned on in advance. A decision that alters the organiza-
tional structure, changes, adds, or deletes some service
that is being performed, or increases or lowers personnel
levels is nonprogrammed.
Now that the general framework and elements of the
decision process have been reviewed, the next section will




B. GENERAL ENVIRONMENT OF MEDICAL CARE DECISIONS
The literature was examined to determine the type of
resource allocation decisions the various decision-makers
in the hospital make. The decision-making process in the
hospital cannot be viewed as simplistic; it is intricate
and complex and no longer the "physician's workshop," but
a "community of interwoven skills and services." [Mountz
1975, p. 161]
.
Many persons argue that today's inflation problem in
health care is primarily due to inefficient decisions in
the hospital sector. To be sure, a great deal of evidence
suggests that too much capacity to perform specific services
exists in hospitals C^a-tionwide) . Hospital decision-makers
are constrained by many factors though: (1) state and fed-
eral regulatory agencies; (2) the expected preferences of
users; and (3) the practices of physicians and insurance
companies. Clearly, hospitals have an acute information
problem for rational planning. They must keep all four
parties- -government , users, physicians, and insurance com-
panies- -happy at the same time [Brown 1978]. Others argue
that hospitals are consuming more and more resources in the
delivery of medical care, not because of inefficiency or
poor management but because of increasing demand for hospital
services over which the hospital has no control; that hospi-
tals are being blamed for the acts of others [Johnson 1977]
.
Hospitals and doctors are regarded as one by the public,
with the physician seen as dictating and controlling all
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activities associated with the hospital. With increasing
frequency since 1966, the Congress and HEW have initiated
controls that penalize hospitals for physician activities.
The hospital has become a technological organization that
provides sophisticated diagnostic and treatment facilities
for a medical profession that has become increasingly
specialized. It no longer exists as a patient care envir-
onment where nursing care was the primary ingredient.
Many of the attempts to model hospital behavior either
view the hospital as controlled completely by administrators'
preferences or lump all decision-making groups into an aggre-
gated whole, creating a fictional entity not related to real-
ity. These "organism" models, viewing the "hospital" as the
acting body, tend to obscure the way operational decisions
are jointly arrived at through the individual actions of
patients, trustees, physicians, administrators, and other
hospital personnel [Redisch 1978]. In a hospital, as well
as other organizations, decision-making is a routinely
occurring process that is never ending, dynamic, and very
important. It can be linked to all of the other management
functions, such as planning, organizing, staffing, and con-
trolling, and is so pervasive in nature that all individuals
in a health care facility who have the responsibility for
resources will make decisions.
Many of those who try to understand or predict the
reaction of hospitals to government regulation tend to over-
look the unique relationship between the hospital and
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the physician. It is the physician, operating as a separate
entity outside the control of the board of trustees or the
administrator, who influences most of the major resource
decisions made in the hospital setting. The physician rec-
ommends admission, takes responsibility for ordering diag-
nostic procedures and therapeudic measures, and determines
when the patient is fit to leave the hospital. In addition,
it is the physician who typically engages in a lobbying
effort with hopes of committing the administrator and trus-
tees to invest in additional bed space, in personnel to help
him provide more and better patient care, and in new and
expensive technology [Redisch 1978]
.
Our high regard for the life of individuals and the
relief of suffering has contributed greatly to the primacy
of the physician in decision-making. The immediate good of
the individual patient is thus placed above the more remote
good of the group, even in the use of scarce resources. The
physician and the patient enter into a personal contract
where the physician is expected to protect the patient from
harm and promote his general welfare. The patient pays the
physician, not the hospital, for this service and the hos-
pital becomes the physician's instrument for its attainment.
Weisbord and Stoewinder [1979] have used the back-seat
driver analogy to describe the current strategies in cost
control measures. The physician alone is the driver of the
car and the most that hospital administration can do is
heckle from the back seat; although to the general public
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it would appear that the administrator is somehow in control
of the car. Cost control legislation efforts have been aimed
at the hospital and only indirectly at the physician; whereas,
the physician, due to his unique relationship with the hos-
pital, is the major decision-maker in the health care delivery
system.
Fuchs [1974] has explained hospital expenditures in terms
of a fairly simple formula:
Expenditures = Admissions x Length of stay x Cost per patient-day
[p. 96].
In order to make any change to the total of hospital expen-
ditures then some change must be made to one of the varia-
bles. It is interesting to note the major player in each
of the variable areas.
1. Admissions
Physicians control admissions; they decide who to
admit and when to admit based on their evaluation of the
patient's medical "need." In addition, the physician is
influenced by many other forces, some of which may have
nothing to do with the patient's medical condition, e.g.,
the general incidence of illness in the community, the
availability of beds, the patient's ability to pay, the
amount and type of medical insurance coverage, and the con-




With few exceptions, the physician determines when
to discharge a patient. The time that a patient stays in
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the hospital is somehow determined by what the physician
feels is "appropriate" for the particular medical condition.
The length of stay for the same condition has been found to
vary among different physicians, different types of hospitals
(large teaching hospital vs. a small community hospital),
and for different regions and population mixes in the U.S.
The length of stay has also been influenced by peer review
and the amount of coverage allowed by third party payers.
3 . Cost per Patient-Day
This cost is determined by the resources a hospital
uses and has available for a particular number of patients
each day. Weisbord and Stoewinder [1979] categorize resource
distribution in the hospital into three functional components
patient care, support services, and administration.
The physician is the conductor, or "driver," of the
first two categories. He directs the patient care team in
their daily care for the patient. The physician determines
the volume of support services, such as diagnostic tests
and patient therapy. Once the physician has admitted a
patient, he determines what kind of and how many diagnostic
tests to order and he decides what kind of and how much
therapy the patient needs.
The last category of administration is the only area
where the administrator has some direct degree of control;
however it, too, is not without influence from the physician.
It is fairly obvious at this point that in order to
have any effect on the hospital expenditures in Fuchs*
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equation we must influence the physician who is the major
player in the variables. Overall, the physician controls
total expenditures through his decision-making power in all
of the variables.
Pellegrino [1972], in writing on the physician's
decision-making process, states that the clinical decision
is the "balance wheel of the hospital operation. It is the
least accessible to organizational control--the most in need
of freedom--yet the most potent of hospital processes for
good and evil. The clinical decision is the most zealously
guarded of the physician's prerogatives and at the same time
the most in need of some kind of surveillance for individual
and public good." [p. 301]. The hospital cannot deal with
impunity with physicians. They are separate and apart from
the hospital, even though they are also part of the hospital
An opposing view to the power of the physician's
decision-making process is presented by Watts [1972] who
feels that the physician is gradually losing his decision-
making power. This is due in part to the increasing general
attitude that health and medical care are too important to
be left to the doctors. It has become an extremely valuable
commodity to more and more people while at the same time
more complex and expensive to deliver. As a result, the
physician has delegated or otherwise given up many decision-
making responsibilities to other allied health professionals
who now make many patient care decisions without the parti-
cipation of the physician. With the increasing power of
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the allied health professionals, multiple levels of quality
and greater fractionation of care will result. It would seem
that Mr. Watts is opposed to the issues that need to be ad-
dressed the most when he states, "... there are many more
kinds of decision makers and their interests are apt to be
more concerned with overcoming barriers to access or contin-
uity of care, or providing more services at less cost, or
with prevention, in the illusory hope that health care costs
can be significantly improved if preventive measures are
effectively used. Those with interests such as these have
tended to focus their decision-making more upon the needs of
the system as such than upon what individual patients need
and want ..." [p. 12]
.
According to Dr. Russell Roth, M.D,, past president
of the AMA, physicians are a part of the solution, not the
! cause, of the problem of high hospital costs. "Though we
don't have a handle on the hospital's costs--its payroll,
the prices it pays for food, supplies, and utilities- -we do
have a handle on how much of this kind of service a patient
uses and how long he stays in bed." [Mountz 1975, p. 161].
It would appear that Dr. Roth has overlooked the role that
the physician has played in the increasing demand on hos-
pitals for advanced equipment and highly skilled allied
health professionals.
The two lines of internal authority in the hospital
can lead to inevitable conflict between administrators and
physicians. Yet the administrator has little at stake in
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opposing physicians, particularly under a regime of uncon-
strained cost reimbursement. Viewed in this light, the
administrator's role is simply to provide labor, supplies,
and facilities to independent physicians. It is the phy-
sician who directs the actual provision of care in the
hospital. In the hospital the medical staff makes the
decisions concerning the delivery of the product, but it
is the administrator whose decisions make it possible to
deliver the product more efficiently and effectively [Jackson
1972, p. 49] .
Zubkoff [1978] feels that the hospital administrator
has little incentive to reduce costs in any non-administra-
tive function. Consumers will talk rationally and objec-
tively about reducing soaring hospital costs as long as
neither the consumer or his family is ill. However, that
same consumer will often seek out the best that money can
buy when illness strikes him or his family. Areas in which
the administrator can have some degree of impact through his
decision-making are: selection and purchase of supplies;
utilities, equipment and capital expenditures; manpower
requirements; local, state, and federal planning activities.
The board of trustees presumably represents the
public interest and bears some form of legal and moral re-
sponsibility for all activities, professional and otherwise,
that occur within the institution. However, while each
member of a typical board is a competent individual in his
own field, he is unprepared for participation in the types
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o£ issues and decisions involved in the management of the
hospital. It is therefore not surprising to see a tendency
in most hospitals for the board to abjure direct responsi-
bility and to delegate authority to some internal physician
group. This tendency is, of course, actively supported by
the AMA, which suggests that "the responsibility of the
hospital governing board is to provide the foundation for
self -governance by the organized medical staff" (ANLA.) . Once
again, de facto physician control over resource-related de-
cisions is not hard to establish [Redisch 1978] .
It is evident that with the pervasive influence of
physicians in resource allocation in the U.S. hospital system
that any method of trying to hold down hospital cost infla-
tion that is aimed solely at the "hospital" will fail miser-
ably. HSA's, certif icate-of -need, rate review, and alter-
native forms of reimbursement all provide the administrator
with a rationale for confronting the physician staff. But
today the benefits of siding with the physician are far more
appealing to the administrator than opposing him. Most
administrators see themselves in competition with other
hospitals for physicians- -not for patients. For without the
physician, the patient cannot be admitted to the hospital.
So, as long as other hospitals will allow him to admit pa-
\ tients, the physician will not be totally dependent on one
hospital to earn his livelihood. The normal and predictable
reaction of the administrator will be not to include or to
put off as long as possible the involvement of the medical
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staff in any negative budgetary decisions that must be made,
It is not surprising that most physicians feel cost contain-
ment is an administrative issue, not a medical one [Redisch
1978] .
C. DECISION-COSTS RESEARCH STUDIES
The literature was reviewed to identify studies which
have been done on the costs of decisions in the delivery of
medical care and the recommendations which have been made
involving decision-making in hospital resource allocation.
It was felt that a review of this nature might point to
areas in which significant cost reduction can be achieved
or lead to other areas that are in need of more research.
The studies and research discovered ranged from general to
very specific cost data and from "administrative" decisions
to "medical staff" decisions.
A study at the New England Deaconess Hospital in Boston
was done to determine the source of the major portion of
hospital costs in the patient's bill. It was found that
approximately 70 percent of the daily basic charge to the
patient was for salaries of hospital personnel. Another 20
percent of the daily basic charge was for the costs of hos-
pital supplies. The most significant hospital operating
cost was general professional care, with nursing care being
the majority of that cost [MacDonald 1971].
To get an idea of how physicians viewed costs, xMedical
World News [1977] had a survey conducted of practicing
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doctors, both general practitioners and specialists. They
had a sample size of over 1,600 from which they received
345 replies, a 21 percent response rate. The results indi-
cated that 75 percent of the doctors felt that hospital
charges are rising too rapidly. The majority opposed man-
datory price controls, but favored more pre-admission testing
of routine admissions and stepped-up surveillance by PSRO of
in-patient care. Voluntary price controls won the approval
of 54 percent of the respondents, while many frowned on other
popular cost-control measures: 43 percent against reducing
contractual fees to nonstaff doctors, 48 percent against
reducing the ceiling of the patient's insurance coverage,
67 percent against second opinions on routine surgery, and
49 percent against greater emphasis on prepaid services
["How Doctors View Hospital Costs" 1977] .
A somewhat similar study was done by Skipper, et al
.
[1976], on the physicians' knowledge of the cost of various
diagnostic tests. The researchers felt that too much empha-
sis was being placed at the macro level on costs rather than
looking at the micro level, such as the charges for labora-
tory tests. Laboratory charges were found to account for
26 percent of the patient bill in their study of 855 adult
patients. Records from 1965-1970 showed that the percentage
increase in laboratory costs was more than double the per-
centage increase in total hospital costs. A list of 31 of
the most frequently ordered laboratory tests was made up and
a total of 90 medical students and physicians were asked to
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estimate the cost to the patient of each test to the nearest
dollar. A total of 69 responded to the questionnaire but
only 61 could be used since 8 of the respondents claimed they
did not know enough about the costs of each test to even
guess. For the purpose of the study, any response that was
within 25 percent Cplus or minus) of the actual cost was
counted as an indication of good knowledge of the cost of
a diagnostic test. Any response that exceeded the 25 per-
cent was counted as poor knowledge of the cost of the test.
The results are shown on the following table:
TABLE VII
PHYSICIAN'S KNOWLEDGE OF COSTS OF LAB TESTS
Medical
Category
No. of No. of (%) High C^) Good (%) Low
Respondents Responses Est. Est. Est.
1st yr student 9 279 45.4 27.6 26.9
2nd yr student 10 310 29.1 30.0 41.0
3rd yr student 11 341 12.6 34.6 52.8
Non-clinical
faculty 8 248 28.6 38.7 32.6
House staff 11 330 30.6 30.9 38.5
Clinical
faculty 12 372 20.7 44.6 34.7




The results indicate that in total, approximately one-
third of the responses showed good knowledge of cost. The
overall tendency of the remainder of the responses was to
underestimate the cost of the test. For students, the
results show that as they progressed through school their
knowledge of the cost of diagnostic tests began to increase.
The shift from overestimation to underestimation was
dramatic. This would lead to the conclusion that the phy-
sician needs to be better informed of the costs of tests.
Many authors advocated physician membership and parti-
cipation on governing boards. Schulz [1972] noted that since
the physician had control of 88.4<(: of the hospital dollar,
he should be involved in the governing board's decision-
making process. He goes on to note, however, that of the
hospitals he surveyed with medical staff board members, only
24 percent allowed physician participation in the review of
income and expense reports.
One hospital which achieved good results with physician
participation on the capital budget committee was the Valley
Hospital located in a suburb of New York. The committee
included three physicians, six trustees, and an administra-
tive staff member, and the committee was chaired by one of
the physicians. The physician members reviewed every capital
equipment request submitted by a clinical department.
Another committee reviewed non-clinical requests. Not stop-
ping at just review and a decision on requests, the committee
also follows up on all equipment it approved ($10,000 or
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more) two or three years after it has been purchased.
This lets the requestor know that he may be required to
support his sales pitch with facts later on [Azzara 1979].
If, in 1975, each of the nation's patient-care physicians
had taken the following actions: (1) reduced the length of
stay by one day for just one patient every week; (2) avoided
overnight stays for two or more patients each week by using
preadmission testing and ambulatory surgery facilities; and
(3) reduced the number of X-rays he ordered each week by one
;' and the number of lab tests by five, total savings would
have amounted to more than $6.6 billion, or 13.6 percent of
! total hospital expenditures for 1975 [Kirchner 1978]
.
In another effort to make physicians more cost conscious,
the American Board of Internal Medicine now includes the
cost of patient workups in its certification exams. The
board provides feedback to the candidates and their training
program directors on the cost of the management methods
selected for test patients. The workup costs don't enter
into the test scoring; they are cited to familiarize candi-
dates with the possibility of saving money by using equally
effective alternatives [Ferber 1979]
.
D . SUMMARY
This chapter contains a literature review on the
decision-making process in resource allocation in the
delivery of medical care. A basic definition of decision-
making is a process where a choice must be made between two
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or more alternatives. With the increasing cost of health
care under more and more scrutiny, in particular hospital
cost inflation, the resource allocation process would seem
to be a logical area to determine whether less costly
alternatives are available and, if so, can the decision-
makers be induced to utilize them.
The next step was to investigate the decision-making
process within the hospital to determine where decisions
were made, who made them, and what were the cost implica-
tions. The majority of the literature reviewed indicated
that it is the physician in his unique position in the
health care system that controls or influences more than
80 percent of the hospital dollar. The physician, for the
greatest part, works independently of the hospital control
system, yet, the focus for cost control measures to date
has been the hospital control structure rather than provid-
ing incentives that will change the physician's decision-
making process.
In the last section, the relationship between decisions
and specific costs and the physician's general knowledge of
costs was explored. Most studies showed that the physician
really had very little knowledge about the costs of the day-
to-day, patient- to-patient decisions he made. Indeed, there
is no incentive for him to know since his bills tend to be
unquestioned and paid by third party payers ! He is concerned
with rising hospital costs, but does not favor any cost
control measure that may cut into his personal income.
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VII. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
Most of the cost-oriented interventions in the health
care sector to date have been externally initiated and treat
the hospital in totality rather than recognizing its compon-
ent parts. The premise of this study is that many costs are
driven up by the decisions of individuals and groups within
the institution. Consequently, an understanding of the
decision process and its outcomes is crucial in the formula-
tion of cost control mechanisms. Specific controls will
require specific knowledge on who makes what types of deci-
sions and why. Just as costs are a function of the hospital's
decisions, so are decisions a function of the organizational
features of the institution.
Four approaches to the problem of defining organizational
realities were discussed: (1) functions and responsibilities;
(2) relationships between bureaucratization and prof essional-
ization; (3) power and influence within the hospital; and (4)
the goals of individuals, groups, and the institution as a
whole.
This study assumes that the health care delivery system,
as we know it today, is not likely to change significantly in
the foreseeable future. The physician remains the dominant
force in the hospital setting. Cost control mechanisms must




The literature review began with aa examination of the
duties, tasks, and responsibilities of the following members
of the hospital: (J.) the governing board, C2} the adminis-
trator, (3} the medical director, and [4) the medical staff.
The review found that the majority of the articles on duties,
tasks, and responsibilities are normative in nature, but fail
to establish a criterion or standard against which measure-
ment can be made. There is an implication that if everyone
performs their duties and responsibilities as described,
proper organizational principles will result and effective
management of the institution can be obtained. Moreover, the
literature implies that effective management will lead to the
ultimate goal of the hospital, the provision of quality care.
However, when one seeks the definition of "quality," it is
most often given in terms of inputs to the production of
medical care (staff, resources, equipment, and drugs) or in
terms of the throughputs (the actual process of care, clinical
practice, and the organization of resources).
There appears to be an anomaly between the stated beliefs
that quality care is a universally held objective and that
goal congruence in the hospital is lacking. For instance,
much of the literature assumes quality care as a common goal
but goes on to describe the hospital in terms of physician




Some contend that conflict arises over the means of
providing care rather than the outcomes. This appears to
be an inappropriate differentiation that confuses, rather
than clarifies the analysis of hospital problems. "Quality
care," while being a positive phrase with which few would
care to argue, remains an ill-defined concept. In fact, it
is hypothesized that the vagueness surrounding the term is
what makes it so appealing. Each individual is allowed to
pursue quality care (the goal) in terms of his own actions
(the process). Therefore, it may be more correct to say
that if means are in conflict, goals must be also.
Since the delineation of functions and responsibilities
appears to be linked to the goal of quality care, and quality
care is subject to varying interpretations, a listing of
organizational duties is analytically suspect. Goals should
precede responsibilities and be related, in some measurable
way, to the obtainment of the hospital's objectives. In fact,
one finds the opposite is true. The literature supports an
inversion of duties and goals, with the former attempting to
define the latter. Consequently, the study of various group
functions within the hospital is seen as largely unproductive.
Even if all the individuals in the hospital performed their
duties as specified in the literature, one would still not
know if care was provided in an efficient and cost-effective
manner.
The duties of the governing board appear to be couched
largely in terms of approval rather than initiation.
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While each may provide control over the functioning of the
organization, the segregation of terms seems to exemplify
some structural features of the hospital, both in the compo-
sition of the board and in the positions of administrator and
medical director. It is suggested that the board tends to
initiate policy in those areas where it perceives itself to
have the necessary expertise. These include such duties as
j
' budgeting, raising capital funds, legal responsibilities, and
j
certain managerial functions such as hiring the administrator
and evaluating his performance. The trustee, who is most
often from a business, legal, or financial background, appears
I
to be comfortable with these responsibilities as they mirror,
to a great extent, his principal occupation.
I
On the other hand, governing boards tend to function in
I
an approval mode when they perceive themselves as lacking
sufficient expertise. Peculiar organizational features of
the hospital and evaluation of medical care are examples of
decisions of this type. The board must rely on the reviews
I
and evaluations of their staff. While "abdication" of respon-
sibilities may be too harsh a word, nevertheless, the board
is often at the mercy of the staff. Staff in this context is
defined as the administrator and medical director. It is
hypothesized that these positions exist primarily to satisfy
the board's requirement for "knowledge resources." These
resources are of increasing importance to the board because
of recent legal decisions specifying trustees as ultimately
responsible for medical care within the institution.
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Although the administrator may have some special expertise
in operating a hospital, it appears that the board can eval-
uate his performance. His usefulness to the board does not
appear to lie in knowledge beyond the board's grasp, but
rather in his day-to-day familiarity with the hospital. Con-
versely, the director has "medical" knowledge, a type of
expertise not easily obtained by the board. While both are
considered "company men," they can exhibit tremendous influ-
ence on the functioning of the hospital: the administrator
with his knowledge of operations and the director with his
knowledge of medicine. Thus, there appears to be a paradox:
the board is legally and morally responsible for the organi-
zation and provision of medical care, but it has little direct
control over the day-to-day operations of the hospital. More-
over, it appears that the board often chooses not to use what
influence it has. Consequently, control over the hospital
rests largely with the administrator, director, and as will
be seen later, the medical staff.
Since the board is largely dependent on others within the
organization, it is hypothesized that the board is not a
proper focal point for cost control interventions. Such
mechanisms must delve deeper into the organization with the
board playing a supporting role
Behavioral and structural features of the hospital have
been analyzed through the concepts of professionalism and
bureaucracy. Much of the literature isolates on one or the
other and concludes that the hospital exhibits elements of both
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It is. hypothesized that the understanding of these concepts
is important in discerning the values of the participants in
the hospital. Professionalism and bureaucracy provide back-
drops for conflict over authority, control, and performance
evaluation. While the literature is well-defined in this
area, it appears less than adequate in describing organiza-
tional features within a profession. Although the basis of
peer review is collective physician control over the indi-
vidual practitioner, few studies have been done on colleague
governance. Perhaps control through a company of equals is
more of an ideal state than an empirical phenomenon. More
research needs to be done in this area.
Lest the reader assumes that physicians have complete
autonomy within the profession, it should be noted that the
physician's nationally oriented power block, the American
Medical Association, may militate against physician autonomy.
The AMA was originally established by physicians to lobby for
legislation beneficial to doctors. However, it is suggested
that the AiMA has grown so large that it has become an insti-
tution unto itself, subject to its own organizational needs
and political influences. The desires of an individual
physician may be subordinated to the needs of the organization
for survival. The AMA can work through, the state and county
medical societies to affect licensing of physicians, or to
bring other pressures upon the practitioner to support the
larger interests of the association. Hence, another paradox
is evident: The professional organization formed to counteract
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the bureaucratic characteristics of hospitals is, in fact,
itself bureaucratic. The collective ideals of physicians
may dominate the individual; exactly the situation to be
avoided in the hospital. Whether or not a single hospital
can ascertain the AMA's influence in its own organization is
problematic. The physician may view the AMA as a teammate
or an opponent. In any event, the AMA appears to have very
little direct influence over controlling the daily actions
of the physician or controlling costs.
In a direct sense, the analysis of professional-bureau-
cratic conflict as a means of determining organizational goals
is mostly unproductive. The characteristics of professional-
ism and bureaucracy focus on the organization of work rather
than goal and task definition. However, as previously noted,
knowledge of objectives is primary in the determination of
costs
.
The value of studying the relationships between profes-
sional and bureaucratic modes of organization is seen in its
implications on struggles over the right to make decisions.
Physicians and hospitals exhibit interdependencies . In today's
complex health care system, neither is likely to survive with-
out the other. However, these interdependencies are seldom
in equilibrium. At any given point in time, one individual
or group tends to dominate the actions of the others. As a
result, constant power struggles occur within the hospital as
less influential persons attempt to increase their organiza-
tional leverage. Concurrently, those individuals or coalitions
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in power attempt to structure the institution and its rules
and regulations to further improve their advantage. Hence,
power to define the organizational realities in hospitals
is seen as both efforts of the dominant force to stay in
power and secondary group's efforts to increase their power.
Power conflicts are determined by the issues of expend-
ability, leverage, and influences of those working in the
hospital. In looking at the four groups studied, it appears
that the physician is the least expendable. The hospital can
still function, to a degree, in the absence of the board, the
administrator, and the medical director as long as the physi-
cian is present. But it ceases to function, almost completely,
without the physician. He alone controls the essential input
into the hospital, the patient.
However, the physician's leverage is not absolute. It is
dependent to a degree on the external alternatives available
to him. These alternatives include: (1) the number of other
hospitals in the geographical area; (2) the physician's
prestige and standing in the community; and (3) the degree
of collective power physicians have in the hospital. On the
latter point, it is suggested that individually the physician
cannot pose much of a threat to the hospital. But collectively,
doctors have the means to turn the hospital to their advantage,
or to seek alternative means of organizing their services.
These alternatives do not appear to be under the control of
the physician in the short- run; however, it does appear that
physicians tend to locate in areas where they can maximize
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the alternatives available. Certainly, the physician has
more mobility than the institution, despite his reliance on
a practice built over a long period of time.
In spite o£ increased professional training and status
of administrators and greater focus on board accountability
for the actions of physicians, it is posited that doctors are
the dominant force in the institution. Their superior organ-
izational position has three causes: (1) only they define
medical care and determine the need for it; (2) they control
the patients and thus utilization; and (3) they control the
complexity and content of the work. Simply speaking, it is
the physician whose control over the production of medical
care is paramount. Moreover, since they control production,
physicians have the strongest influence over the costs- of
medical care. It is their decisions in the day-to-day delivery
of services that result in a major component of health care
costs. Therefore, it is hypothesized that to control hospital
costs, one must develop methods of influencing the physician
in his decision-making process.
B. CONCLUSIONS
Current cost control mechanisms are being applied to the
hospital both externally and internally. Their success in
controlling costs is dependent on the power and influence of
the participants in the hospital, most especially the physician
as the dominating figure.
Internal cost control interventions are professionally
controlled. They include such processes as Professional
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Standards Review Organization (PSRO) and utilization review.
It appears that these methods of control are compromised
because they are controlled almost totally by the physician.
Physicians tend not to override the professional judgement
of other practitioners within reasonable boundaries. More-
over, it is physicians who establish the definition of reason-
able boundaries. It is suggested that in this type of control
there is no reason to believe that the whole will be any more
effective than the sum of its parts. It is doubtful that
collective control of costs and utilization by physicians will
be substantially different from the actions of the individual
physicians themselves.
External control of costs, primarily through government
and third-party reimbursement, is directed to the hospital as
a whole rather than to any one group within the hospital.
However, because it does not focus on the dominant figure in
the hospital- -the physician- - its chances of success are
limited.
Controls generated from outside the institution must pass
through the organizational positions of governing board,
administrator, and medical director. While the governing
board is responsible for compliance with the controls, the
administrator and the medical director are instrumental in
determining the degree to which controls filter down to the
medical staff. This poses a significant problem since the
relationships between the director and the administrator are
ill-defined. On the one hand, they are both "company men,"
129

but they lack a common background. The administrator
approaches the hospital from an organizational and bureau-
cratic perspective. The director, despite his administrative
type of position, is likely to retain many of the ideals and
precepts associated with professionalism. A second diffi-
culty is the lack of agreement on which duties each is to
perform. No generalization of administrator-director rela-
tionships can be drawn from the literature. Each hospital
appears to be unique; differing perspectives and duties are
integrated through negotiation. The significance of indi-
vidualized relationships is the lack of predictability from
one hospital to another. Since there is no way of knowing
i how cost control measures will be altered as they pass
through the administrator-director filter, one cannot predict
with any certainty how useful the administrator or director
will be in implementing cost control interventions.
Efforts for cost control can be broached from two per-
spectives: (1) resource allocation; and (2) resource utili-
zation. The control of resource allocation can be viewed
in the traditional managerial sense. It focuses on actions
like planning, controlling growth, sharing services, contract
management services, and certificate of need laws. These
functions are seen as being within the scope of the admin-
istrator's responsibilities. They represent management
responses to rising costs in the hospital. While they are
important methods for reducing demand on the hospital's
resources, it is posited that they cannot stand alone.
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Additional mechanisms are required. This study postulates
that few attempts have been made for control through the
second perspective. The control of resource utilization is
necessary to a much greater extent because the physician
determines almost completely the resources consumed in the
hospital. More specifically, the essence of hospital util-
ization occurs when the physician makes an internalized,
professional judgement based on his estimation of need for
treatment of a specific patient. It is at this point that
a majority of institutional resources are committed and costs
incurred. The physician decides what care is to be given,
the quantity to be provided, the intensity of the care, and
the length of the treatment. Therefore, the following con-
clusion is reached: To control costs in hospitals, incen-
tives must be determined that will cause the physician to
integrate the elements of cost control into his subset of
professional judgements.
There is no need to force physicians to have the same
goals as administrators, medical directors, and governing
boards. What is needed are interventions, both structural
and behavioral, that will facilitate goal congruence among
all the parties. In this regard, perhaps more research
should be directed towards incentives like those found in
Prepaid Group Practice and Health Maintenance Organizations.
These organizations seem to have been able to alter to some
degree the internalized judgement process that the physician




AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION DESCRIPTION OF FUNCTIONS
OF GOVERNING BOARDS, ADMINISTRATORS, AND MEDICAL STAFPl
The American Hospital Association has formulated a trustee
development program designed to improve the performance and
understanding of hospital boards of directors. This effort
has culminated in the formal detailing of the functions be-
longing to the board, the administrator, and the medical
staff. Each function is followed by examples.
GOVERNING BOARD
1. Establish and maintain procedures for conducting the
business of the board.
a. Hold regular meetings.
b. Follow parliamentary procedures.
c. Keep minutes of meetings.
d. Establish committee structure.
2. Establish and update goals and policies for the hospital.
a. Provide high-quality medical care for the entire
community Cgo^l)*
b. Limit admissions of Medicare patients Cpoiicy)
.
c. Refuse to perform abortions (policy).
Sources: "Trustee Development Program - Unit 1"
Trustee April 1977, pp. 17-24.
"Trustee Development Program - Unit 2"
Trustee May 1977, pp. 17-24.
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3. Develop and continuously update a long-range plan for
the hospital and ensure that decisions are made in
accordance with that plan.
a. Make current decisions in line with the long-range
plan.
b. Evaluate trends in medical care and delivery.
c. Identify services to be offered and those not to be
offered.
4. Monitor and evaluate plans and programs to ensure that
they meet hospital goals and policies and the objectives
of the long-range plan.
a. Approve affiliation with another hospital.
b. Approve acquisition of major medical equipment.
c. Review proposal for addition of burn unit.
5. Ensure the hospital's long-range financial stability.
a. Invest large cash balances.
b. Review hospital rate structure.
c. Make decisions concerning lease or purchase of
equipment.
d. Plan development program and engage in fund raising.
6. Select the Chief Executive Officer, define his duties
and responsibilities, and evaluate his performance.
a. Identify selection criteria.
b. Conduct formal performance review.
7. Approve selection of medical staff and ensure that it
is properly organized.
a. Approve addition of surgeon to medical staff.
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b. Award privileges to physicians.
c. Approve recommended reappointments.
d. Approve utilization review reports.
8. Provide a process for evaluation of all phases of hos-
jm pital performance, including the quality of medical care.
a. Approve ranges for efficient department operation.
b. Question high rate of normal tissues removed.
c. Ensure compliance with various codes and standards.
9. Ensure that the community the hospital serves is well
informed about the goals and performance of the hospital;
ensure that the hospital is meeting the community's needs
a. Survey community health care needs.
b. Provide for special health needs of the hospital's
community.
c. Represent varied community groups.
ADMINISTRATOR
The administrator is directly accountable to the board
of trustees for the day-to-day operation and administration
of the hospital. Thus, his duties complement those of the
trustee. The administrator has the following functions:
1. To develop and maintain programs that implement board-
authorized goals and policies.
a. Develop a program for ensuring on-going communica-
tions with Health Systems Agency.
2. To develop and, with board approval, implement an
organizational and staffing plan for hospital operations.
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a. Clearly specify limits of authority delegated to
employees
.
3. To act as a liaison to the community and to other health
care institutions.
a. Serve on a state health care advisory group.
4. To coordinate and facilitate appropriate interaction and
communication among the various groups working at the
hospital.
a. Make sure that the board and the medical staff are
communicating appropriately.
5. To develop and implement evaluation procedures for all
functional areas of the hospital.
a. Report wage and salary administration plan.
6. To safeguard and ensure appropriate use of hospital
resources
.
a. Report to the board on hospital performance as
shown by operating budgets.
MEDICAL STAFF
The organized medical staff is directly responsible for
the quality and scope of medical services delivered in the
hospital. This authority is delegated to the medical staff
by the board, which retains the ultimate and legal responsi-
bility for the quality of patient care. Depending upon the
hospital, there are six or seven areas of responsibility
that make up the role of the medical staff:
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1. To implement policies and procedures designed to provide
patients with the best possible medical care.
2. To recommend medical staff appointments and clinical
privileges in order to provide a balanced and competent
medical staff.
a. Recommend appointment of surgeon with privileges to
perform orthopedic surgery.
3. To develop and implement a quality assurance mechanism,
including peer review of the process and the outcomes
of care.
a. Perform medical audit.
b. Conduct tissue committee review.
4. To provide continuing medical education for its members,
a. Offer a course on allergic reactions.
5. To develop an organizational structure that will enable
the medical staff to relate to the board and to govern
itself.
a. Develop medical staff bylaws.
b. Select chief of staff.
c. Set up committees.
6. To provide graduate medical education, if necessary.
a. Provide residency training program.
7. To conduct medical research as authorized.




CATHOLIC HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION DESCRIPTION OF FUNCTIONS
OF GOVERNING BOARDS, ADMINISTRATORS, AND MEDICAL STAFPl
The Board of Trustees of the Catholic Hospital Associa-
tion has developed two documents dealing with the functional
responsibilities of trustees, administrators, and medical
staff. The first of these, published in 1970 and entitled,
"Responsibilities, Functions, and Selection Criteria for
Hospital Boards of Trustees," was board specific. Subse-
quently, the Catholic Hospital Association recognized the
need for a second document dealing with the other main com-
ponents in the hospital. This document was forthcoming in
1974 and was entitled, "Guidelines on Roles and Relationships
of Board, Chief Executive Officer, and Medical Staff of
Catholic Hospitals and Long-Term Care Facilities." The
following is a summary of the functions identified within
these two publications.
GOVERNING BOARD
1. To determine the hospital's objectives and major policies
a. Analyze and evaluate data which reflects the
community's present and projected health needs.
Sources: "Guidelines on the Responsibilities, Functions,
and Selection Criteria for Hospital Boards of Trustees."
Hospital Progress
,
February 1970, pp. 35-46.
Farrier, Robert M. "Board, CEO, and Medical






b. Require professional administrative staff to make
available, on a regular, periodic basis a profile
of the present and projected needs of the community
served.
c. Require administrative staff to continually suggest
and/or clarify hospital objectives, goals and
policies
.
d. Establish criteria for evaluating the adequacy of
objectives, goals, and policies.
e. Determine whether the hospital's philosophy and
policies are consistent with those of the sponsoring
group.
f. Determine the scope of services to be offered.
g. Determine changes to be made in the scope of services
offered.
h. Approve, reject, or modify objectives, goals, and
policies- - the controlling expressions of the hospital
entity.
2. To assure that major plans and programs are designed to
meet objectives.
a. Provide a long-range plan, in written form.
b. Appraise the community's health needs and the
hospital's objectives and plans in terms of their
compatibility.




To establish a suitable mechanism for conducting the
business of the board.
a. Elect officers of the board.
b. Establish and/or abolish committees of the board.
c. Appoint chairmen and members to committees of the
board.
d. Define the powers of committees of the board.
e. Recruit new board members.
f. Determine the size of the board.
g. Remove ineffective board members,
h. Fill vacancies on the board.
i. Maintain, revise, and enforce the corporate charter
and bylaws.
To approve hospital organization and major authority
delegation patterns.
a. Review the hospital organizational structure and
approve major organizational changes.
b. Require final approval by the board before any
proposed changes can be implemented in the bylaws,
rules, and regulations governing groups within the
hospital
.
To select and appoint the chief executive officer
(administrator)
.
a. Define responsibilities and extent of authority of
the chief executive officer.
b. Determine job performance standards for the position
of chief executive officer.
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c. Conduct periodic reviews of the chief executive
officer's performance relative to the predetermined
performance standards.
d. Fix compensation of chief executive officer.
e. Ensure the existence of a plan for continuity of
top management.
To maintain a qualified medical staff.
a. Ensure that an adequate system exists to effectively
examine and review credentials and delineate medical
staff members' privileges.
b. Establish a means of ensuring that information the
board needs to make decisions on the appointment,
suspension, termination, and reappointment of medical
staff members is made available.
c. Ensure that an adequate appeal mechanism exists which
protects the rights of physicians whose privileges
have been denied or restricted.
To provide for long-range financial stability.
a. Determine hospital policy in regard to procuring
finances for growth.
b. Determine hospital policy concerning borrowing,
leasing, or other methods of financing.
c. Determine guidelines for major areas of care
utilization.
d. Approve broad rate policies.
To make major hospital decisions.
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Ia. Approve financial and other major reports that are
directed to the public and other interested parties,
b. Approve major short-term loans and all term loans.
c. Review and/or approve major contracts, such as
those for acquisition or sale of real estate.
d. Authorize officers to sign various written binding
documents and to take final action.
e. Approve major personnel and labor relation policies
P and programs that shape the essential character of
personnel and labor relations.
f. Approve all merger or acquisition activities.
9. To safeguard hospital assets.
a. Approve, reject, or modify hospital budgets (operat-
ing and capital) submitted by the chief executive
officer.
b. Select and retain outside auditors.
c. Approve actions that dispose of substantial assets.
d. Review and approve donations and contributions to
and by the hospital.
10. To approve board policies concerning relationships with
external groups or organizations,
a. Provide for such representation and involvement in
national, state, and local hospital association
boards, planning agencies, consumer groups, and




b. Maintain contact with legislators and government
agencies
.
c. Approve, reject, or modify hospital policy positions
concerning legislation, governmental agency admin-
istrative policies, and other matters of public
policy.
11. To analyze and evaluate the total hospital operation
including all activities and services.
a. Identify the board's need for information and arrange
for timely supply of this information.
b. Provide for independent review of performance reports
c. Review hospital performance in terms of policies,
objectives, and plans.
d. Inquire into causes of major performance deficiencies
e. Take appropriate action to correct deviations from
planned and desired standards of performance, as
indicated.
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
1. To integrate the philosophy of the sponsoring group into
the total operation of the patient care facility.
a. Establish an information system which will help all
employees and physicians to fully understand the
sponsoring group's philosophy.
b. Establish educational and discussion programs to
determine how this philosophy can be more meaningful
and visible to patients and the community.
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c. Evaluate the effect that implementing the philosophy
has on the overall quality of care.
2. To initiate programs that ensure that adequate comprehen-
sive planning takes place throughout the institution and
to be sure that there is developed orderly decision-making
processes within the facility.
a. Recommend new policies and objectives to the board,
in response to identified needs.
b. Develop programs to achieve both short and long
range institutional objectives.
c. Participate in board evaluations of civic community
and institutional needs.
d. Implement board-authorized decisions on policy and
obj ectives
.
3. To assure the development and implementation of a plan
for delegating authority which assigns responsibility
for specific procedures to specific positions within
the organizational structure, including the medical staff
organization.
a. Clearly define responsibility and specify the limits
of authority delegated to each subordinate who
reports to the chief executive officer.
b. Develop a plan whereby each such subordinate is
responsible for developing and submitting short and
long range objectives for approval.
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c. Assure that each subordinate has a plan for dele-
gating authority and exacting accountability within
his area of responsibility and that the plan is
functioning properly.
4. To establish mechanisms for exacting accountability
from the medical staff and to act as the official
channel of contact between the board and the medical
staff organization.
a. Keep the board informed of the clinical practice
and participation of each physician in the opera-
tion of the medical staff organization.
b. Assure that the official channels between board,
chief executive, and medical staff remain open and
effective.
c. Establish appropriate mechanisms for decision-making
by physicians within the limits of delegated
authority.
5. To appoint subordinate managers to positions of authority,
provide for their continued development, and evaluate
their performance.
a. Determine performance standards for each subordinate
who reports to the chief executive officer.
b. Provide a plan for continuity of succession in all




c. Develop management talent at all levels of the
organization, including the medical staff, by
encouraging managers to attend internal and external
management development programs.
d. Evaluate the individual's performance as a member
of the management team.
6. To develop a system for coordinating and integrating all
resources available to the medical care institution in
an effort to achieve the primary objectives of excellence
in the provision of care to those who need it.
a. Establish a system by which decisions are made at
the most appropriate organizational level.
b. Establish criteria for evaluating the merits of
actual or suggested decisions.
c. Involve physicians, subordinate managers, and
employees in the decision-making process.
d. Develop a management information system that provides
necessary information to those who need it when they
need it.
e. Periodically evaluate the communication system to
determine its effectiveness.
7. To establish evaluation systems for all aspects of
organizational operation, including the quality of care
provided, and regularly report the evaluation results
to the board.
a. Insure that information collected and recorded is
pertinent to the objectives of the institution.
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b. Take appropriate action to correct deviations
from established plans.
c. Insure that in each subordinate department, the
manager is utilizing appropriate information in
evaluating his department's performance and eval-
uating each individual employee's performance.
d. Evaluate the need for modifying activities when
modification is appropriate in order to respond
effectively to new needs or changed conditions.
To actively participate in improving the health care
delivery system in an effort to make comprehensive care
available to all citizens.
a. Serve on committees, boards, and advisory groups in
the local community which will influence the local,
state, and national health care delivery system.
b. Carry out those policies of the hospital that relate
to local health planning efforts.
c. Cooperate with other health or patient care agencies
and providers in improving the level of health in
the local community.
d. Periodically report to the board on how the facility
fits into the overall community health plan.
To inform members of the religious congregation assigned
to the hospital of issues that are of concern to them as
members of the sponsoring group.
a. Conduct meetings with local religious groups to in-




10. To insure the safeguarding and appropriate use of
institutional resources (people, facilities, and
finances)
.
a. Submit budgets to the board for action.
b. Regularly report to the board the results of actual
performance compared to approved budgets.
c. Present long-range plans for providing additional
resources and changes in services.
MEDICAL STAFF
1. To serve as a quality control mechanism designed to
insure the continual upgrading of the quality of medical
care rendered by physicians, with the safety and interest
of patients taking precedence over all other concerns.
2. To provide a formal structure, within the total insti-
tutional organization, whereby physicians can participate
in the institution's policy-making and planning process
in an organized fashion.
3. To review, analyze, and evaluate the clinical practice
of all members of the medical staff to determine the
quality of medical care in the hospital.
4. To make recommendations to the chief executive officer
and the board for establishing, maintaining, and enforc-
ing professional standards for the continuing improvement
of the quality of care rendered in the health care
facility.
5. To report regularly to the board on the quality of
medical care in terms of these professional standards.
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To exercise necessary discipline over the members of
the staff for violation of policies of the institution,
within the limitations of the authority delegated by
the board.
To plan and implement continuing education programs
directed toward improving the quality of care provided.
To assure that the objectives to be achieved by the
medical staff organization are within the context of the
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